 







    

 

 



DRIVEN TO FAILURE: AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF DRIVER’S LICENSE
SUSPENSION IN NORTH CAROLINA
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ABSTRACT
A person’s interest in a driver’s license is “substantial,” and as the
U.S. Supreme Court has observed, the suspension of a license by the
state can result in “inconvenience and economic hardship suffered,”
including because a license may be “essential in the pursuit of a
livelihood.” However, forty-four U.S. states currently require indefinite
suspension of driver’s licenses for non-driving-related reasons, such as
failure to appear in court or pay fines for traffic infractions. There are
no systematic, peer-reviewed analyses of individual-level or countylevel data regarding such suspensions. This study describes North
Carolina’s population of suspended drivers and assesses how driver’s
license suspension statutes operate relative to geography, race, and
poverty level. First, it analyzes four decades of active-suspension data
in North Carolina and finds over 1,225,000 active suspensions for
failures to appear or pay traffic fines, amounting to one in seven adult
drivers in the state. Second, it compares these data to county-population
data; county-level traffic-stop data, collected as required by statute in
North Carolina; and county-level data on the volume and composition
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of traffic court dockets. This study reveals that driver’s license
suspensions are not associated with either the volume of traffic stops or
the size of the traffic court docket. In contrast, we find that black and
Latinx people are overrepresented relative to the population. Linear
mixed-level modeling regression analyses demonstrate that the
population of white people below the poverty line and black people
above the poverty line are most strongly associated with more
suspensions. Finally, this Article explores implications of these results
for efforts to reconsider the imposition of driver’s license suspensions
for non-driving-related reasons. These patterns raise constitutional
concerns and practical challenges for policy efforts to undo such largescale suspension of driving privileges.
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INTRODUCTION
“I was only going like 3 mph over the speed limit,” said a Durham,
North Carolina resident.1 The fine, though, was for hundreds of
dollars.2 “I just couldn’t afford it. I have four kids.”3 He lost his driver’s
license, an automatic consequence for failure to pay traffic fines in
North Carolina, which in turn impacted his housing and employment.4
But now, based on a collaborative effort in the city, he had the court
debt forgiven and his license restored: “It means the world . . . . I’m
employed, I’m able to go spend quality time with my kids.”5 One out
of five Durham residents have a suspended or revoked driver’s license,
and there are tens of thousands more in the city who suffer the
consequences of traffic fines and fees.6
A person’s interest in a driver’s license is “substantial,” and as the
U.S. Supreme Court has observed, the suspension of a license by the
state can result in “inconvenience and economic hardship suffered,”7
especially because a license may “become essential in the pursuit of a
livelihood.”8 A suspended license can result in negative consequences
ranging from job loss, to restricted career opportunities, to limited
mobility, to name a few.9 However, until recently, all fifty states and
the District of Columbia had in place laws that permit driver’s licenses
to be suspended or withdrawn for non-driving-related reasons,
1. Sarah Krueger, Durham Program Offers Second Chance to NC Drivers with Suspended,
Revoked License, WRAL.COM (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.wral.com/durham-program-offerssecond-chance-to-nc-drivers-with-suspended-revoked-license/18255320 [https://perma.cc/WGV7WBR2].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10–11, 19 (1979) (finding, in light of the due-processprotected property interest in a driver’s license, that a state hearing process was adequate for
contesting a license suspension for refusal to take a blood-alcohol breath-analysis test).
8. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (“Once [driver’s] licenses are issued . . . their
continued possessionmay become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. . . . [L]icenses are not
to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
9. See ALICIA BANNON, MITALI NAGRECHA & REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST., CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 2, 24–29 (2010),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S9PW-4CUY] (noting that states, including North Carolina, “suspend driving
privileges for missed debt payments, a practice that can make it impossible for people to work
and that can lead to new convictions for driving with a suspended license”); ALEXES HARRIS, A
POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR 50–51 (2016)
(discussing the detrimental consequences of nonpayment).
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including failure to comply with child-support orders, failure to
maintain proper insurance, failure to appear in court or pay fines for
vehicular violations, and many others.10 In recent years, due to legal
challenges and legislative change, several jurisdictions have removed
such consequences.11 However, forty-four U.S. states still require
suspension of driver’s licenses for non-driving-related reasons—
indefinitely in thirty-nine states.12 Policies related to failure to pay
traffic fines or appear in court are not designed primarily to promote
public safety, but rather to use suspension to induce payment and
compliance.13 In that context, driver’s license suspension is a stateemployed debt-collection tool. Existing data suggests that at least
eleven million Americans, and perhaps far more, have suspended
licenses.14 However, prior research findings are largely limited to four
states and descriptive analyses.15 Here, we expand our understanding
of license suspensions by studying a new state, North Carolina, and
modeling how race and poverty predict suspensions.
This study is the first to examine comprehensive individual-level
and county-level driver’s license suspension data. Thanks to the North

10. JON A. CARNEGIE & ROBERT J. EGER, III, AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADM’RS,
REASONS FOR DRIVER LICENSE SUSPENSION, RECIDIVISM, AND CRASH INVOLVEMENT AMONG
DRIVERS WITH SUSPENDED/REVOKED LICENSES i, v–vi (2009), https://www.nhtsa.gov/
sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/811092_driver-license.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5AK-9L7Y].
11. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-201(6)(b) (2019) (ending the practice of driver’s
license suspension for nonpayment of traffic fines); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 1109(b) (2019) (same);
see also infra Part IV.
12. See MARIO SALAS & ANGELA CIOLFI, LEGAL AID JUSTICE CTR., DRIVEN BY
DOLLARS: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSION LAWS FOR
FAILURE
TO
PAY
COURT
DEBT
7–9
(2017),
https://www.justice4all.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/Driven-by-Dollars.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK5K-J3YN] (“Of the 44
jurisdictions that suspend driver’s licenses for unpaid criminal or traffic court debt, 39 do so
indefinitely.”); see also Meghan Keneally, ‘It’s Not America’: 11 Million Go Without a License
Because of Unpaid Fines, ABC NEWS (Oct. 25, 2019, 3:11 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/
vicious-cycle-11-million-live-drivers-license-unpaid/story?id=66504966 [https://perma.cc/9TLTS8QF] (summarizing a study by the Fines and Fees Justice Center reporting a decrease in the
number of states that suspend licenses over unpaid fees and fines); Joint Statement on Texas
Repeal of the Driver Responsibility Program, FINES & FEES JUST. CTR. (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/2019/09/09/joint-statement-on-texas-repeal-of-the-driverresponsibility-program [https://perma.cc/G439-64YS] (noting that as of Fall 2019, six states—
California, Idaho, Mississippi, Montana, Texas, and Virginia—and Washington, D.C., have
abolished driver’s license suspensions for non-driving-related reasons).
13. Keneally, supra note 12 (interviewing Nusrat Choudhury, the deputy director of the
ACLU’s Racial Justice Program, who makes this argument).
14. Id.; see also infra Part II.B.
15. See infra Part II.B (summarizing prior research regarding driver’s license suspensions in
Wisconsin, California, New Jersey, and New York).
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Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts (“AOC”), we were able
to acquire all active driver’s license suspensions for failures to appear
in court and failures to pay fines and fees. We provide a descriptive
analysis of the demographics and characteristics of the state’s
population of all drivers suspended for non-driving-related reasons,
including for failure to appear and failure to pay fines and fees. Then
we conduct a series of mixed-level modeling regression analysis for the
2010 to 2017 time period, including two additional datasets: North
Carolina traffic-stop data and county-level traffic court docket data,
also from the AOC. These analyses allow us to quantify the role of race
and poverty in predicting the number of suspensions at a county level
and rule out other plausible explanations for disparate suspension
rates, such as disparate traffic-stop rates or traffic court cases. Our
analyses are available on the Open Science Framework (“OSF”).16
These findings have constitutional implications. The U.S.
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there is a constitutionally
protected liberty and property interest in a driver’s license that cannot
be revoked or suspended “without that procedural due process
required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”17 That said, the Court has
approved postsuspension hearing processes, at least for short-term
suspensions,18 and lower courts have been divided in recent
constitutional challenges to driver’s license suspension schemes.19
What makes these findings particularly relevant, however, is not just

16. See William Crozier & Brandon Garrett, North Carolina Drivers License Suspensions,
OPEN SCI. FRAMEWORK (Dec. 2, 2019, 7:28 AM), https://osf.io/fwxja [https://perma.cc/LZ4MDU83] (providing aggregate data, data-cleaning method, code, and preregistration). This site also
contains information on the source of the data, the preregistration of analyses, and the general
project.
17. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
18. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10–12 (1979) (approving a state’s procedure for ninetyday driver’s license suspensions, which made available only postsuspension hearings to challenge
the suspension).
19. Recent constitutional litigation has challenged driver’s license suspension statutes largely
on due process grounds. See, e.g., Stinnie v. Holcomb, 396 F. Supp. 3d 653, 656–57 (W.D. Va.
2019); Thomas v. Haslam, 329 F. Supp. 3d 475, 479–80 (M.D. Tenn. 2018), vacated as moot sub
nom. Thomas v. Lee, 776 F. App’x 910 (6th Cir. 2019); Mendoza v. Garrett, 358 F. Supp. 3d 1145,
1150 (D. Or. 2018); Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d 758, 778–80 (M.D.
Tenn. 2016); see also Press Release, ACLU of N. Cal., Landmark Lawsuit Settled, Paves Way for
Fair Treatment of Low-Income California Drivers (Aug. 8, 2017) [hereinafter ACLU Press
Release], https://www.aclunc.org/news/landmark-lawsuit-settled-paves-way-fair-treatment-lowincome-california-drivers [https://perma.cc/J4FH-Y26B]. The North Carolina driver’s license
suspension statute is presently the subject of federal litigation. See Johnson v. Jessup, 381 F. Supp.
3d 619, 623–24 (M.D.N.C. 2019) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection claims),
appeal filed, No. 19-1421 (4th Cir. Apr. 19, 2019).
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the scale of the driver’s license suspensions, but that they are
disparately imposed on minorities and poorer communities. These
findings have implications for equal protection and due process
challenges in which disparate enforcement of unfair procedures
magnifies the constitutional harm.20 Indeed, some courts that have
granted relief in constitutional challenges to driver’s license
suspensions have focused on an “equal process” theory in which both
the equal protection and due process analyses play a role.21
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins by describing the
constitutional and statutory background concerning driver’s license
suspension. It then describes the North Carolina driver’s license
suspension statute and the procedures involved in suspending licenses
for failure to appear in court and failure to pay traffic fines. Part II
reviews the literature concerning fines and fees, misdemeanor criminal
justice, and driver’s license suspensions in particular. Part III turns to
the empirical analysis of data concerning the 1.25 million driver’s
license suspensions in North Carolina. Part IV concludes by exploring
the political and constitutional implications of these findings. It
emphasizes that important questions remain for future research that
could inform constitutional litigation, local restoration efforts,
dismissals of charges, and legislative efforts to restore licenses and end
the suspension of driver’s licenses for non-driving-related traffic
offenses. These findings relate to larger efforts to document and
address the overuse of fines, fees, and bail in our criminal and civil
court systems.22 Large-scale and holistic efforts are needed to undo the
effects of such systemic deprivations of rights.
I. THE LAW OF DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSION
This Part begins by providing an overview of federal constitutional
decisions regarding the suspension of driver’s licenses, focusing on
both due process and equal protection claims. Second, this Part
provides an overview of the growth of driver’s license suspension
statutes nationally and how federal regulation incentivized that
20. For a discussion of the equal protection, due process, and cumulative “equal process”
claims in such legal challenges, see generally Brandon L. Garrett, Wealth, Equal Protection, and
Due Process, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397 (2020).
21. Id. at 25–26.
22. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, FINES, FEES, AND BAIL: PAYMENTS IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT THE POOR 2–3 (2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/1215_cea_fine_fee_bail_issue
_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q238-RDP4].
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practice. Third, this Part describes the North Carolina statutes related
to driver’s license suspension and how they operate in the state.
A. Constitutional Decisions on Driver’s License Suspensions
By the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court had addressed the practice
of driver’s license suspension as part of its development of procedural
due process rights in the context of the administrative state. The Court
has interpreted the Due Process Clause to require the state to provide
notice and an opportunity to be heard before it deprives an individual
of a protected liberty or property interest.23 An individual holds both a
liberty and property interest in their driver’s license because it affects
their livelihood and ability to travel.24 As the Court has put it, “driving
an automobile [is] a virtual necessity for most Americans.”25 Therefore,
as the Supreme Court held in Bell v. Burson,26 a driver’s license is
protected and subject to procedural due process requirements.27 When
the state suspends a person’s driver’s license, doing so does not always
require actual notice or personal service, but rather notice that is
“reasonably calculated” to reach affected parties.28 Thus, procedural
due process requires that the state provide an individual notice of a
deprivation and an opportunity to be heard in order to guard against
erroneous deprivation.29 Such notice must be made “at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner.”30 In conducting this inquiry, courts
may consider the individual and state interests at issue, as well as the
risk of an erroneous deprivation.31

23. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 348 (1976).
24. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10 (1979) (recognizing that the suspension of a
driver’s license “implicates a protectible property interest”); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539
(1971) (“Once [driver’s] licenses are issued . . . their continued possession may become essential
in the pursuit of a livelihood.”). State courts had recognized this earlier as well. See, e.g., Hecht v.
Monaghan, 121 N.E.2d 421, 423–24 (N.Y. 1954).
25. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
26. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
27. Id. at 539.
28. See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
29. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
30. Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
31. Id. at 348. Due process first requires a determination of whether a protected interest is
implicated, then an inquiry into what process is due:
[A] weighing process has long been a part of any determination of the form of hearing
required in particular situations by procedural due process. But, to determine whether
due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the ‘weight’ but
to the nature of the interest at stake.
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More recently, it has been the lower federal courts that have
addressed suspensions for non-driving-related reasons, such as
nonpayment of traffic tickets or failure to appear in court.32 Some of
those courts have addressed equal protection and due process claims
jointly,33 following the reasoning of the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Bearden v. Georgia.34 In that case, the Court held that courts cannot
revoke probation for failure to pay a fine or victim restitution without
finding that alternatives would not satisfy the state’s interest in
ensuring payment.35 In this type of analysis, “[d]ue process and equal
protection principles converge.”36 The dual concern with inequality
where criminal outcomes affect those who cannot afford to pay and
with unfair process that does not adequately consider ability to pay
results in a constitutional violation.37 Thus, the Court has emphasized
in this line of cases that a state may not subject an indigent person,
“who, by definition, is without funds,” to a harsher punishment “solely
because [they are] unable to pay [a] fine.”38 Thus, both procedural due
process and equal protection concerns may play a role in constitutional
analysis of driver’s license suspension practices.
B. Federal Legislation and Driver’s License Suspensions
The nationwide practice of suspending driver’s licenses for nondriving-related reasons is rooted in the shifts in federal policy toward
drug enforcement and child-support collection, which began in the late
1980s.39 As part of a tough-on-drugs policy, Congress—in the Drug
Offender’s Driving Privileges Suspension Act—amended the Highway
Apportionment Act to allow withholding of federal highway funds

Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570–71 (1972) (footnote omitted); see also
State v. Shawn P., 859 P.2d 1220, 1230–31 (Wash. 1993) (Madsen, J., dissenting) (addressing
whether driver’s licenses can be suspended for reasons not having to do with safety and driving).
32. See, e.g., Fowler v. Benson, 924 F.3d 247, 252 (6th Cir. 2019); Johnson v. Jessup, 381 F.
Supp. 3d 619, 624–25 (M.D.N.C. 2019), appeal filed, No. 19-1421 (4th Cir. Apr. 19, 2019); Stinnie
v. Holcomb, 396 F. Supp. 3d 653, 657–58 (W.D. Va. 2019).
33. Garrett, supra note 20, at 25–26.
34. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
35. Id. at 672–73.
36. Id. at 665.
37. Id. at 667–69, 672–73.
38. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242 (1970).
39. Barbara Corkrey, Restoring Drivers’ Licenses Removes a Common Legal Barrier to
Employment, 37 J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 523, 523 (2004).

 

2020]







    

 

DRIVEN TO FAILURE

 



1593

from any state that failed to suspend the licenses of drug offenders.40
Additionally, the 1988 Family Support Act created federal childsupport guidelines,41 which incentivized states to suspend licenses for
nonpayment of child support or risk losing federal funds. The Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
officially made it a requirement for states to have procedures in place
authorizing such suspensions.42 This federal legislation encouraged
states to create administrative procedures to suspend such licenses to
avoid burdening the court systems.43 A subsequent General
Accountability Office study found that the child-support-related
legislation may not have been effective in motivating noncustodial
parents to pay past-due child-support obligations.44 Regardless, those
federal requirements played an important role in promoting the

40. The Act was an amendment to a Department of Transportation appropriations act.
Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-516, § 333,
104 Stat. 2155, 2184–86 (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. § 159(a)(3)(2018)). The Act withholds
federal funds from states unless they meet certain requirements:
[T]he State has enacted and is enforcing a law that requires in all circumstances, or
requires in the absence of compelling circumstances warranting an exception—(i) the
revocation, or suspension for at least 6 months, of the driver’s license of any individual
who is convicted, after the enactment of such law, of—(I) any violation of the
Controlled Substances Act, or (II) any drug offense . . . .
Id. For more on the political environment in which the Act was enacted, see generally Aaron J.
Marcus, Are the Roads a Safer Place Because Drug Offenders Aren’t on Them?: An Analysis of
Punishing Drug Offenders with License Suspensions, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 557 (2004).
41. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 667 (2018)).
42. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, § 369, 110 Stat. 2105, 2251 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(16)). The law
provides:
[E]ach State must have in effect laws requiring the use of . . . [p]rocedures under which
the State has (and uses in appropriate cases) authority to withhold or suspend, or to
restrict the use of driver’s licenses, professional and occupational licenses, and
recreational and sporting licenses of individuals owing overdue support or failing, after
receiving appropriate notice, to comply with subpoenas or warrants relating to
paternity or child support proceedings.
42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(16).
43. RYAN T. SCHWIER & AUTUMN JAMES, IND. UNIV. ROBERT H. MCKINNEY SCH. OF
LAW, ROADBLOCK TO ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE: HOW DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSION
POLICIES IN INDIANA IMPEDE SELF-SUFFICIENCY, BURDEN STATE GOVERNMENT & TAX
PUBLIC RESOURCES 22 (2016) (“To avoid burdening state court systems, the [Family Support]
Act encouraged the use of administrative procedures. As a result, license suspension programs
became a popular tool for many states.”).
44. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-02-239, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT:
MOST STATES COLLECT DRIVERS’ SSNS AND USE THEM TO ENFORCE CHILD SUPPORT 23
(2002), http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/233361.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q4V-7DQ6].
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development of state-level automated systems for suspending driver’s
licenses.
C. Driver’s License Suspension in North Carolina
Today in North Carolina, as in other states, a driver’s license can
be suspended or permanently revoked for a wide range of reasons,
including speeding, reckless driving, and driving while impaired
(“DWI”) or refusing to take a blood or breath test. Licenses may also
be suspended as part of a criminal court sentence or via a decision of
another state agency, such as for the failure to pay child support.45 If
that other court or agency agrees that the suspension should be
discontinued, then one must still pay a fee for the restoration of the
driver’s license—a sixty-five dollar restoration fee and a fifty-dollar
service fee—to the Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) and apply
for a new driver’s license.46 In cases in which a person was charged with
a motor-vehicle offense, there are two reasons why driver’s licenses
may be indefinitely suspended in North Carolina: failure to appear
(“FTA”) for a court date and failure to comply (“FTC”) with a fine,
penalty, or court costs. One can also be suspended for both reasons.
The first reason is a failure to appear in court upon receipt of a
notice for a hearing or trial for a motor-vehicle offense.47 Traffic cases
in North Carolina are heard by district courts, which handle
misdemeanors, although larger districts create separate and dedicated
traffic courts.48 If a person does not appear on the date scheduled, then
the case is marked as “called and failed.”49 After twenty days, the court
issues a “Failure to Appear,” which results in an additional FTA fee.50
After twenty additional days pass, the court notifies the DMV of the
FTA through the Automated Criminal and Infraction System

45. Suspended License in North Carolina, DMV.ORG, https://www.dmv.org/nc-northcarolina/suspended-license.php [https://perma.cc/H39Q-26F8]; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.5
(2019) (establishing civil license revocation); id. § 20-17.8(g) (suspension for violation of the
ignition-interlock restriction).
46. Suspended License in North Carolina, supra note 45.
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-24.1(a)(1) (listing “failed to appear, after being notified to do so,
when the case was called for a trial or hearing” as the first reason for a mandatory license
revocation).
48. Traffic Violations, N.C. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.nccourts.gov/help-topics/traffic-andvehicles/traffic-violations [https://perma.cc/CTR3-H96W].
49. Id.
50. Id.
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(“ACIS”) and a driver’s license is suspended.51 The DMV then sends a
notice of revocation.52
The second reason for an indefinite suspension in North Carolina
is for failure to pay a fine, penalty, or court costs ordered in a motorvehicle offense,53 which this Article refers to as failures to comply or
“FTC” cases. The fines include the underlying fines imposed for the
traffic offense itself.54 Additional costs may include a fee for an FTA,
which is $200.55 As a result, FTAs may lead to FTCs.
An indefinite driver’s license suspension remains in place in North
Carolina until the person “disposes of the charge,” if there was an FTA,
or shows that they were not the person charged with the offense.56 For
an FTC, the person may cure the revocation by paying the amount or
by demonstrating that the failure “was not willful” and that the person
“is making a good faith effort to pay” or that the amount “should be
remitted.”57 It is worth noting that no showing of willful failure to pay
is required before a court revokes a driver’s license for failure to
comply.58 If one of those conditions for restoration is met before the
effective date of the revocation order, the license is restored; however,
if that date has expired, then the person must pay the restoration fee
and satisfy DMV requirements to receive a new license, as noted.59 In
addition, judges may supply limited driving privileges so a person can
drive to work or receive emergency medical care while a revocation
remains in place.60

51. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-24.2(a)(1) (requiring courts to report FTAs to the DMV);
see also WAYNE SMOAK, N.C. JUDICIAL DEP’T, OVERVIEW OF ACIS 6, 16–17 (2004),
https://connect.ncdot.gov/groups/NCTRCC/Documents/Administrative%20Office%20of%20C
ourts.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2UM-4H6G].
52. Traffic Violations, supra note 48.
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-24.1(a)(2) (listing “failed to pay a fine, penalty, or court costs
ordered by the court” as the second reason for a mandatory license revocation).
54. N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, TRAFFIC OFFENSES FOR WHICH COURT
APPEARANCE MAY BE WAIVED 1–2 (2017), https://www.nccourts.gov/assets/documents/
publications/traffic.1.7.pdf [https://perma.cc/7C9E-ZPJT].
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-304(a)(6).
56. Id. § 20-24.1(b)(1)–(2).
57. Id. § 20-24.1(b)(3)–(4).
58. Id. § 20-24.1(a)(2) (mandating revocation for any FTC).
59. Id. § 20-24.1(c).
60. The driving privilege is limited to certain enumerated circumstances:
A limited driving privilege is a judgment issued in the discretion of a court for good
cause shown authorizing a person with a revoked driver’s license to drive for essential
purposes related to any of the following:
(1) The person’s employment.
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Without such exceptions, however, it is an offense to drive while a
license is revoked (“DWLR”), knowing that the license is revoked, and
the charge results in an additional fine and up to twenty days in jail.61
North Carolina has a similar misdemeanor offense if the revocation
was for an impaired-driving offense.62 In 2013, the legislature also
enacted additional DWLR offenses, creating a separate Class 1
misdemeanor offense for driving with a license revoked for impaired
driving.63
North Carolina’s license suspension statute, adopted in 1985,64
resembles those in many of the states in which unpaid court debt or
nonappearance results in indefinite driver’s license suspension.65
Importantly, the driver’s license must be suspended before the person
has an opportunity to present information concerning ability to pay.66
In North Carolina, as in most jurisdictions,67 court systems now
electronically transmit records of nonpayment or nonappearance to
the DMV.68 This system permits rapid and large-scale implementation
of driver’s license suspensions.
II. THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON DRIVER’S LICENSE
SUSPENSION
This Part reviews the literature related to this Article’s research
questions regarding how driver’s license suspensions are imposed in
practice. First, it describes related research regarding the misdemeanor
system in the United States and its impact, including on marginalized

(2) The maintenance of the person’s household.
(3) The person’s education.
(4) The person’s court-ordered treatment or assessment.
(5) Community service ordered as a condition of the person’s probation.
(6) Emergency medical care.
(7) Religious worship.
Id. § 20-179.3(a).
61. Id. § 20-28(a).
62. Id. § 20-28(a1).
63. Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2013, § 18B.14.(f),
2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 995, 1305–06 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-28(a1)(2019)).
64. An Act To Classify Minor Traffic Offenses As Infractions and To Provide a Procedure
for the Disposition of Such Infractions by the Courts, ch. 764, § 19, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 1111,
1115 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-24.1 (2019)).
65. See SALAS & CIOLFI, supra note 12, at 8.
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-24.1(a)–(b).
67. SALAS & CIOLFI, supra note 12, at 7.
68. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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groups. It provides an overview of the broader literature on fines and
fees and describes the literature regarding traffic stops and racial
profiling by police. Second, this Part describes the limited empirical
research available concerning driver’s license suspensions, which are
this Article’s focus.
A. Misdemeanors, Fines and Fees, and Traffic Stops
Driver’s license suspensions resulting from traffic cases are a
subset of the criminal misdemeanor system’s collateral-consequences
problem in the United States. Despite its expansive size, only recently
have empirical attempts been made to quantify and understand the
true breadth of misdemeanor cases in the United States. One such
recent study estimates that there are 13.2 million misdemeanor cases
filed each year and that such cases disproportionately affect poor
people and people of color.69 On the front end, misdemeanor
enforcement and prosecution can vary widely between jurisdictions, in
part due to how police decide to exercise their discretion.70 On the back
end, despite expectations that misdemeanors are less consequential
than felonies, Professor Jenny Roberts concludes the system is in crisis
because of insufficient resources, too many cases, and a lack of
guidelines on how to prosecute and defend misdemeanor cases.71 This
system results in high rates of guilty pleas—many of which may very
well be false because of little to no development of evidence—and
widespread consequences.72 However, studies of misdemeanor
outcomes often exclude data from traffic cases—or at least non-DWI
traffic cases—due to the size of traffic court dockets, inconsistency in
reporting on traffic outcomes, and difficulty in obtaining data
concerning traffic cases.73
Researchers have documented the expansion of criminal fines,
fees, and other costs imposed in states, including in North Carolina, in
general and not just in traffic cases. These legal financial obligations

69. Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 B.U. L. REV.
731, 731 (2018).
70. See Illya Lichtenberg, Police Discretion and Traffic Enforcement: A Government of
Men?, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 425, 430 (2003) (noting that “only certain offenders [are] subjected
to the quasi-criminal penalties of traffic enforcement at the discretion of the police”).
71. Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 277–78 (2011).
72. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2012).
73. See Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 69, at 773–75 (noting the exclusion of traffic
violations and other traffic cases in annual reports of misdemeanor cases in various state courts).
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(“LFOs”) encompass all of the different types of financial charges
imposed in criminal cases. Researchers estimate over $50 billion in
total LFOs have been imposed in the United States.74 In North
Carolina, fees increased an average of 400 percent from 1997 to 2017.75
Researchers have documented increases in recent years in such LFOs
assessed, such that they often exceed penalties for underlying
offenses.76 These LFOs can multiply over time, resulting in mounting
court-related debt.77 Court debt can make it difficult for individuals to
secure employment, housing, public assistance, and reinstatement of
driver’s licenses.78 In North Carolina traffic cases, the underlying traffic
fine may amount to less than $100, but subsequent fines for failure to
appear in court and court costs may be many times more. There is a
related concern that incentives exist for municipalities to use these
LFOs as a revenue-generating mechanism that, as highlighted in the
federal investigation into practices in Ferguson, Missouri,79 gets
imposed disproportionately on the poor.
Research on traffic enforcement has documented significant racial
disparities in stops made by patrol officers as well as in poststop
conduct, including in analysis across large numbers of jurisdictions.80
Studies of North Carolina data—which is available due to statewide

74. Neil L. Sobol, Fighting Fines & Fees: Borrowing from Consumer Law To Combat
Criminal Justice Debt Abuses, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 841, 849 (2017).
75. HEATHER HUNT & GENE R. NICHOL, JR., N.C. POVERTY RESEARCH FUND, COURT
FINES AND FEES: CRIMINALIZING POVERTY IN NORTH CAROLINA 4 (2017).
76. Sobol, supra note 74, at 863.
77. See ALEXES HARRIS ET AL., MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 4 (2017), http://www.monetarysanctions.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/MonetarySanctions-Legal-Review-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/33UH-BX9Q] (describing mechanisms for
how “[u]npaid legal financial obligations can trigger additional sanctions,” thus increasing the
total debt owed (emphasis omitted)).
78. Rebecca Vallas & Roopal Patel, Sentenced to a Life of Criminal Debt: A Barrier to
Reentry and Climbing out of Poverty, 46 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 131, 135
(2012).
79. See generally CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015) [hereinafter DOJ INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE
DEPARTMENT],
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/
attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P359-GALH]
(investigating and reporting on the practices of the Ferguson municipal government and
municipal police departments, including the use of fees and fines in municipal courts as an
important source of revenue on an annual basis).
80. See generally EMMA PIERSON ET AL., A LARGE-SCALE ANALYSIS OF RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN POLICE STOPS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES (2019), https://5harad.com/papers/
100M-stops.pdf [https://perma.cc/PT2E-P938] (analyzing one hundred million patrol stops and
showing evidence of racial bias both in local police and highway patrol stops).
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legislation requiring collection of traffic-stop data, including
demographic data81—have found evidence of such racial disparities,
particularly regarding stop decisions by local police.82 A more recent
study of North Carolina traffic-stop data found that police stopped
black drivers for discretionary and minor infractions more often, but
then let them go with no police action more often than white drivers.83
Similarly, police conducted consent and probable-cause searches more
often on black drivers, but they found contraband less often than
during searches of white drivers.84 Such patterns suggest that while
there may be persistent racial disparities in stops, there may not be for
subsequent police action, such as traffic tickets.
B. Driver’s License Suspension Research
The impact of driver’s license suspension deserves careful
examination; it is a nearly national phenomenon, with forty-four states,
as noted, suspending licenses for non-driving-related reasons. The
impact of such suspensions is broad and includes economic and legal
aspects. Such suspensions do not appear to provide an increase in
public safety, as drivers suspended for non-driving-related reasons are
much less likely to be involved in a crash than drivers suspended for
driving-related reasons.85 Those with suspended licenses face a variety
of impediments, such as limited employment prospects—both because
they cannot transport themselves to work and because many employers
in industries such as truck driving and food service require a driver’s
license—as well as difficulty obtaining medical care and reduced ability
to participate meaningfully in society, particularly in places in which

81. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-903 (2019).
82. Patricia Warren et al., Driving While Black: Bias Processes and Racial Disparity in Police
Stops, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 709, 729–31 (2006) (including behaviors such as frequency of highway
travel, speeding, not wearing a seatbelt, changing lanes frequently, and frequently running yellow
lights).
83. Sharon LaFraniere & Andrew W. Lehren, The Disproportionate Risks of Driving While
Black, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/us/racial-disparitytraffic-stops-driving-black.html [https://perma.cc/5TT5-HS3W].
84. Id.
85. CARNEGIE & EGER, supra note 10, at vi; see also MICHAEL A. GEBERS & DAVID J.
DEYOUNG, CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, AN EXAMINATION OF THE CHARACTERISTICS
AND TRAFFIC RISK OF DRIVERS SUSPENDED/REVOKED FOR DIFFERENT REASONS 24 (2002),
http://dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/forms/about/profile/rd/r_d_report/section_4/s4-200.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W5JU-5YGU] (concluding that California drivers suspended for nondriving offenses “had the
lowest crash risk of any of the suspended/revoked groups,” barely higher than those with valid
driver’s licenses).
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public transport is limited.86 One study found that 42 percent of
respondents to a survey lost employment following a driver’s license
suspension.87 Since driving is such an important means of
transportation, there is evidence that most who have suspended
licenses continue to drive. According to one study, 75 percent of those
who have licenses suspended continue to drive.88 Those drivers are
then more likely to be convicted of driving on a suspended or revoked
license, which can lead to still more serious fines and criminal charges,
including felony charges in some states.89 In three years in Texas, there
were four hundred thousand prosecutions for driving with a suspended
license.90
It is not known how many people nationwide are affected by
driver’s license suspensions. According to one estimate, based on data
from the forty-two states and the District of Columbia that shared data,
more than seven million people may have driver’s licenses suspended.91
A handful of studies of driver’s license suspensions in recent years have
uncovered the scale of such actions, but little empirical research—and
none of it peer reviewed—has been done on this subject to better
understand how these suspensions are imposed and their effects.

86. See JON A. CARNEGIE, ALAN M. VOORHEES TRANSP. CTR., RUTGERS, STATE UNIV. OF
N.J., DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSIONS, IMPACTS AND FAIRNESS STUDY 17–20, 55–59, 63–64
IMPACTS
AND
FAIRNESS
STUDY],
(2007)
[hereinafter
CARNEGIE,
https://www.nj.gov/transportation/business/research/reports/FHWA-NJ-2007-020-V1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E283-VNGP] (surveying literature indicating the economic and social effects of
license suspensions, surveying New Jersey residents about adverse effects of suspension, and
listing a variety of restricted-use license programs in other states that attempt to mitigate lack of
employment, education, medical, and other problems exacerbated by having a suspended
license).
87. Id. at 56.
88. Joseph Shapiro, How Driver’s License Suspensions Unfairly Target the Poor, NPR (Jan.
5, 2015, 3:30 AM), https://www.npr.org/2015/01/05/372691918/how-drivers-license-suspensionsunfairly-target-the-poor [https://perma.cc/8WLH-WCPJ].
89. Driving While Revoked, Suspended or Otherwise Unlicensed: Penalties by State, NAT’L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/drivingwhile-revoked-suspended-or-otherwise-unli.aspx [https://perma.cc/KW8U-NJ24] (surveying
legislation in all fifty states, including several that impose felonies, such as Florida, Georgia, and
Illinois).
90. Andrea M. Marsh, Rethinking Driver’s License Suspensions for Nonpayment of Fines and
Fees, in 2017 TRENDS IN STATE COURTS: FINES, FEES, AND BAIL PRACTICES: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES 20, 23 (Deborah W. Smith, Charles F. Campbell & Blake P. Kavanagh eds.,
2017).
91. Justin Wm. Moyer, More Than 7 Million People May Have Lost Driver’s Licenses
Because of Traffic Debt, WASH. POST (May 19, 2018, 4:18 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/public-safety/more-than-7-million-people-may-have-lost-drivers-licenses-because-of-trafficdebt/2018/05/19/97678c08-5785-11e8-b656-a5f8c2a9295d_story.html [https://perma.cc/HM28-4NL7].
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Nationwide estimates have been affected by changing practices in some
states. For example, California had been a major center of driver’s
license suspensions, where four million adults—17 percent of the adult
population—had a license suspension;92 however, in 2017, California
enacted a statute ending the practice of suspending driver’s licenses.93
Similarly, in Virginia, nearly one million drivers had suspensions94 prior
to a recent legislative change.95 In Texas, it is 1.8 million people.96
Beyond reports that provide information regarding aggregate numbers
of suspended drivers in states in which data has been available, only a
few state-level research efforts have described the number and
demographics of those suspended.
First, a 1998 report from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and the
surrounding area found a large number of suspensions—nearly seventy
thousand adults—due to failure to pay traffic fines.97 These suspensions
were disproportionately people in poverty, primarily centered in lowincome, urban areas of Milwaukee.98 The report also found that
driver’s license suspensions were economically limiting, as many of the
jobs and open jobs were in areas of the city that required easy
transportation to access.99 More recently, Professors John Pawasarat
and Louis M. Quinn found similar patterns in Milwaukee, such that
“[i]n most situations, ‘driving while poor’ in Wisconsin . . . has more
serious consequences than leaving the scene of an accident, passing a

92. ALEX BENDER ET AL., NOT JUST A FERGUSON PROBLEM: HOW TRAFFIC COURTS
DRIVE INEQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA 9 (2015), https://www.lccr.com/wp-content/uploads/NotJust-a-Ferguson-Problem-How-Traffic-Courts-Drive-Inequality-in-California-4.8.15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A84L-5MX9].
93. Associated Press, California No Longer Will Suspend Driver’s Licenses for Traffic Fines,
L.A. TIMES (June 29, 2017, 9:50 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-driverlicense-fees-20170629-story.html [https://perma.cc/72GX-T7UG].
94. SALAS & CIOLFI, supra note 12, at 1.
95. Caleb Stewart, Virginia Lawmakers Vote To Eliminate Driver’s License Suspensions over
Fees, WHSV (Apr. 4, 2019, 1:24 PM), https://www.whsv.com/content/news/Governor-wants-toend-license-suspensions-for-unpaid-fees-503353961.html
[https://perma.cc/QS55-EUF6]
(reporting on a state budget amendment that reinstated the suspended licenses of more than six
hundred thousand Virginians).
96. SALAS & CIOLFI, supra note 12, at 1.
97. JOHN PAWASARAT & FRANK STETZER, EMP’T & TRAINING INST., REMOVING
TRANSPORTATION BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT: ASSESSING DRIVER’S LICENSE AND VEHICLE
OWNERSHIP PATTERNS OF LOW-INCOME POPULATIONS iii (1998), https://www4.uwm.edu/eti/
reprints/DOTbarriers.pdf [https://perma.cc/856G-YUYJ].
98. Id. at iii–v, 7–10, 27.
99. Id. at v–vi.
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school bus with flashing red lights, or driving more than 25 miles per
hour above the legal limit.”100
Second, a California report examined the number of suspensions
and evidence of disparate impact in particular communities.101 The
report concludes that the financial costs of the original ticket explode
when a license is suspended, affecting individuals’ ability to get to work
and maintain a job.102 In turn, the original fine becomes more difficult
to pay off in addition to the other financial hardships associated with
longer commutes or unemployment.103 Further, the authors concluded
that formerly incarcerated individuals and their families and
communities of color are particularly vulnerable to this cycle.104
Additionally, such suspensions carry societal costs, including costs to
public safety, because resources are diverted from real public safety
concerns and provide a hurdle to postincarceration reentry; the court
system, because of the administrative cost of the trials; state social
services, because higher unemployment puts more strain on the
agencies; and the DMV, because it has to track and restore
suspensions.105
Third, a New Jersey study examined data on suspensions,
surveyed those who had driver’s licenses suspended, and found that
although only about three hundred thousand New Jersey drivers were
suspended at any time—only 5 percent of the population without much
variation year to year—42 percent of those suspended drivers reported
job loss, particularly those in urban and lower-income areas.106
Fourth, an online report with analysis of New York state data
regarding driver’s license suspensions in 2016, published by the
100. JOHN PAWASARAT & LOIS M. QUINN, EMP’T & TRAINING INST., ISSUES RELATED TO
WISCONSIN “FAILURE TO PAY FORFEITURES” DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSIONS 2 (2014),
http://dc.uwm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=eti_pubs [https://perma.cc/CGF5E8F4].
101. BENDER ET AL., supra note 92, at 19. The California DMV did not track case-level
information such as the race of people subject to suspensions. Id.
102. Id. at 6–7.
103. Id. (describing how families choose between paying fines and meeting basic needs).
104. Id. at 19.
105. Id. at 20–21 (describing fines and suspensions as a “hidden tax” on public safety, the
economy, and state government).
106. CARNEGIE, IMPACTS AND FAIRNESS STUDY, supra note 86, at 1, 56. For this study’s
survey design and findings, see generally JON A. CARNEGIE, ALAN M. VOORHEES
TRANSPHTTPS://PERMA.CC/66Q3-5CCS. CTR., RUTGERS, STATE UNIV. OF N.J., DRIVER’S
LICENSE SUSPENSIONS, IMPACTS AND FAIRNESS STUDY: VOLUME 2: TECHNICAL APPENDICES
(2007), http://vtc.rutgers.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/MVC-DL-Susp-Final-Report-Vol2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/66Q3-5CCS].
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nonprofit partnership Driven by Justice Coalition, describes and
visually depicts approximately 680,000 suspensions for traffic debt in
that year, including both FTC and FTA cases.107 The statistical analyses
that they report mirror what we find in North Carolina, in which both
race and poverty are associated with suspension rates.108
To summarize, the existing data on driver’s license suspensions are
from three states and one urban area. Those unpublished analyses
suggest that license suspensions are fairly common, affecting hundreds
of thousands of people per state, and that people of color and
vulnerable communities are disproportionately affected. They are
primarily descriptive in nature and do not allow for quantifying the
effects of license suspensions. Here, we explore whether these findings
hold in North Carolina by describing the state population of individuals
with suspended licenses and using linear mixed-model regressions to
quantitatively explore the relationship between poverty, race, and
suspensions.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF NORTH CAROLINA DRIVER’S LICENSE
SUSPENSION DATA
This Part turns to an empirical analysis of data provided by the
North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts, reflecting all cases
in which there was an active driver’s license suspension in North
Carolina for an FTC or FTA as of September 2018. In Section A, we
describe the data sources and the design of our analyses. In Section B,
we present descriptive data, including the demographics of those
affected by these suspensions. In Section C, we describe these data over
time. In Section D, we describe the geographic distribution of
suspensions in North Carolina by county.
Finally, in Section E, we present the results of a regression analysis
aimed primarily at quantifying the relationship between race, poverty,
and suspension rates in each county. Specifically, we rely on several
models that used the number of people with an FTA suspension, an
FTC suspension, or suspensions due to both an FTA and FTC per
county per year between 2010 and 2017 as an outcome variable. We
included as variables the number of white and black individuals above
and below the poverty level in each county in each year. We also
107. Joanna Weiss & Claudia Wilner, Opportunity Suspended: How New York’s Traffic Debt
Suspension Laws Disproportionately Harm Low-Income Communities and Communities of
Color, DRIVEN BY JUST. COAL., https://www.drivenbyjustice.org [https://perma.cc/Y79K-X8XF].
108. See id.
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brought in data concerning the number of traffic stops and the number
of traffic cases in each county in each year to assess whether traffic
stops and the size of the traffic docket account for variation in the
downstream driver’s license suspensions.
A. Data and Design
The data file analyzed here, provided by the North Carolina AOC,
reflects all cases, as of September 2018, in which court records reflect
that a driver’s license suspension was reported to the North Carolina
DMV and the suspension is currently in place. These data come from
ACIS.109 The time period extends back to the 1980s110—which we
report in the subsequent descriptive sections—but we only include data
from 2010–2017 in regression models. In 2011, the AOC adopted a new
data system,111 and coverage during the period from 2011 to the present
may be better. In addition, the further back the cases extend, the more
likely it is that the person affected may be deceased or may have moved
out of state.
The suspension cases analyzed reflect individuals with FTCs and
FTAs, and sometimes both, as the reason for the suspension. These
cases represent individuals who have active suspensions for at least one
FTA and/or FTC charge but exclude suspensions that result from a
criminal sentence, such as a DWI. Importantly, these data do not
reflect cases in which a license was restored because the person paid
the fine or appeared in court and paid FTA-related fines. For each
individual, we attribute the suspension to the county in which the
license was suspended, not necessarily the county of residence. Some
individuals had multiple FTAs and/or FTCs, sometimes for the same
event, and sometimes for multiple events across several years. To
account for these individuals, we used the earliest active suspension
and excluded subsequent suspensions from analysis; to accomplish this,
we excluded repeat individual names. As a result, we excluded
different individuals with the same name—a conservative strategy that

109. See generally TECH. SERVS. DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, AUTOMATED
CRIMINAL/INFRACTIONS SYSTEM (ACIS) CRIMINAL INQUIRY MODULE USER MANUAL (2010)
[hereinafter ACIS USER MANUAL], https://www.nccourts.gov/assets/documents/publications/
Criminal-Inquiry-Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/55HA-VVSN] (describing how to use the ACIS
criminal module).
110. ACIS USER MANUAL, supra note 109, at PF1-ICA Inquiry 10.
111. EBI Screening Expert, North Carolina Changes Retrieval Access to Criminal Records,
EBI (Mar. 11, 2011), https://www.ebiinc.com/bid/55328/north-carolina-changes-retrieval-accessto-criminal-records [https://perma.cc/Y8N7-G6HP].
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was preferable to problems introduced by other strategies, such as
pairing names with birthdates but birthdates were often inconsistent
across individuals. The county-level data and code for data cleaning
and analyses are available on the OSF.112
In addition to a descriptive analysis, we also performed a series of
mixed-model linear regressions (“MLM”) to understand the
relationship between race, poverty, and driver’s license suspensions.
These allowed us to control for random variation between years and
counties and with better precision estimate the relationship between
the predictor variables we care about and outcome variables on North
Carolina driver’s license suspensions from 2010–2017. We used this
time period, rather than the entire dataset, because 2010 was the
earliest year for which we had values for all variables. By analyzing at
the county-year level, we have eight hundred total observations—eight
years of data for each of North Carolina’s one hundred counties. We
also include data on the number of traffic stops and traffic court cases
in each county to test the hypothesis that more traffic stops result in
more traffic cases, which result in more suspensions, independent of
race and poverty factors. We performed identical sets of regression
analyses for three outcome variables: the number of unique people
with currently active suspensions, per county, due to (1) an FTC; (2) an
FTA; and (3) both FTC and FTA, for each year from 2010–2017.
We used random-effects linear-regression analyses to assess the
relationship between suspensions and the aforementioned predictors.
We decided on this approach because of the nature of our data:
specifically, one hundred counties, with data from eight years, in which
traffic stops and traffic cases are missing from some years and some
counties. Mixed-model linear-regression analyses allow us to model
variation in data that is not independent from other predictors—
specifically, county and year. Additionally, we can control for betweencounty variation in suspension rates that may be the result of varying
factors unique to each county. With this approach, we can estimate the
amount of variation in suspensions that may be due to “random
factors,” such as factors that differ from county to county and year to
year. For example, variation in gas prices between years, ruralness, and
different road conditions between counties may affect driving
behavior, which may in turn affect traffic stops, cases, and suspensions.
Additionally, variation between years and counties on suspension
policies, enforcement, and restoration would affect county-level
112.

See Crozier & Garrett, supra note 16.
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variation in suspensions as well. MLMs control for such variation,
giving us a clearer picture of how the predictors in each model relate
to the number of active suspensions. Of course, MLM does not
completely control for all potential endogenous variables—or
important variables we may not measure—but it does allow us to
capture a more accurate picture than we would see with fixed-effect
modeling alone.
B. Demographics and Driver’s License Suspension
Consistent with findings from other states, driver’s license
suspensions are frequent in North Carolina. We find that there are
1,225,000 individuals with active driver’s license suspensions in North
Carolina—827,000 for FTAs, 263,000 for FTCs, and 135,000 for both.
This constitutes about one in seven, or 15 percent, of all adult drivers—
who total about 8.25 million people—in North Carolina. These driver’s
license suspensions are heavily disproportionate in their imposition on
black and Latinx drivers. As Table 1 reveals, of those with driver’s
license suspensions, 33 percent of those with FTA suspensions are
black and 24 percent are Latinx, while 36 percent are white. For FTC
suspensions, 47 percent of drivers with such suspensions are black, 11
percent are Latinx, and 37 percent are white. By comparison, the North
Carolina driving population is 21 percent black, 8 percent Latinx, and
65 percent white.
Table 1: Racial Demographics of Suspended Drivers

White

Black

N

N

%

Latinx
%

N

%

Native
American Asian
N

%

N

%

Other
N

%

Total
N

%

FTA 295,690 35.8 269,627 32.6 200,546 24.3 9,059 1.1 2,228 0.2 49,379 6.0 826,539 67.5
FTC 98,787 37.5 122,991 46.7 30,130 11.4 4,733 1.8 627 0.2 6,167 2.3 263,435 21.5
Both 50,011 37.1 68,036 50.5 9,669

7.2 4,702 3.5 196 0.1 2,152 1.6 134,766 11.0

Total 444,488 36.3 460,654 37.6 240,345 19.6 18,494 1.5 3,051 0.0 57,698 4.7 1,224,730 100.0

Additionally, Table 2 illustrates further information about
suspended drivers. Specifically, males make up the majority of
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suspended drivers, and the median age at which the offense occurred
is about 28.67 years old. Further, many suspended drivers also have a
DWLR charge. It is a Class 3 misdemeanor to drive with a suspended
license,113 as well as a Class 1 misdemeanor if the license was suspended
for driving while impaired.114 The presence of a DWLR charge reflects
a person who had their license suspended, continued to drive, and was
subsequently charged with another violation.
North Carolina officers file a large volume of DWLR charges each
year. Over the five years from 2013–2017, there were about 160,000
charges a year.115 We observe the same racial disparities in DWLR
convictions as one observes in driver’s license suspensions—not
displayed in the table. For DWLR charges filed from 2013–2017, 39
percent or 297,537 of the defendants were white, 54 percent or 412,282
were black, and 7 percent or 55,182 were Latinx.
Table 2: Gender, Age, and DWLR Charges of Suspended Drivers

Male (%)

Female
(%)

Unknown
(%)

Median age at
offense (SD)

Median
suspension
length (SD)

FTA

626,421
(75.8)

199,564
(24.1)

544
(0.0)

28.33 (10.99)

11.4 (8.76)

130,773
(15.8)

FTC

189,891
(72.1)

73,402
(27.9)

142
(0.0)

29.79 (10.81)

5.82 (7.89)

72,802
(27.6)

Both

100,987
(74.9)

33,745
(25.0)

34 (0.0)

28.71 (9.78)

9.52 (8.20)

98,800
(73.3)

Total

917,299
(74.9)

306,711
(25.0)

720 (0.0)

28.67 (10.83)

10.1 (8.64)

302,375
(24.7)

DWLR
(%)

113. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-28(a) (2019).
114. Id. § 20-28(a1).
115. Special thanks to Frank Baumgartner for his help in creating helpful spreadsheets
displaying AOC data on DWLR charges for the five-year period from 2013–2017. In 2017, AOC
reports 148,000 such charges. In 2016, there were 161,000 DWLR charges; in 2015, there were
164,000 charges; in 2014 there were 160,000 charges; and in 2013 there were 162,000 charges.
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Figure 1 displays the demographics of those who have, as of 2018,
suspended driver’s licenses in North Carolina, as compared with the
adult driving population of North Carolina. We note that this is not a
direct comparison because some of those with current suspended
licenses may be out of state drivers, people who are deceased, or
people who no longer live in North Carolina. These suspensions were
imposed over many years, as discussed below, and so would not
necessarily reflect present-day state demographics. To summarize,
people of color are disproportionately represented in relation to their
percentage of North Carolina’s driving population. Additionally, FTA
suspensions are particularly high for the Latinx population, suggesting
that demographic may be failing to appear for reasons other than
failing to pay fines and fees.
Figure 1: Suspensions by Race Compared to North Carolina
Driving Population

C. Active Driver’s License Suspensions By Year
We also counted the number of active suspensions from each year.
As shown in Figure 2, many drivers have long-standing suspensions
stretching back to the 1980s. Further, tens of thousands of people have
suspensions that have been active for decades. Unfortunately, we do
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not have information—such as cured FTCs and FTAs—that would
allow us to observe whether there is a trend toward greater or reduced
imposition of driver’s license suspensions on a yearly basis. Further,
because we have information only on active suspensions, we are unable
to assess whether year-to-year variation is due to policy changes
resulting in more or fewer suspensions or, rather, more opportunities
for people to pay fines. We can report here only the numbers of stillactive suspensions. To be sure, over time, one can observe steadily
increasing numbers of driver’s license suspensions. One would expect
to see fewer old suspensions because, over time, people can make
efforts to pay fees and costs or cure an FTA in order to restore their
driving privileges. However, it is worth noting how many suspensions
remain after several years, suggesting that a driver’s license suspension
is not easily cured and can be a long-term burden.
Figure 2: Currently Active Suspended Drivers per Year

D. Geography and Driver’s License Suspension
We next describe the geographic distribution of suspensions in
North Carolina by county. In a detailed Appendix B we report data,
including demographic information, for all one hundred North
Carolina counties. Unsurprisingly, we find that there is a strong
positive correlation between the driver-aged population (sixteen years
or older) of a county and the number of active suspensions (r = 0.847,
95% CI [.780, .894], p < 0.001). This trend is best reflected in the
scatterplot below, in which we have labeled some of the larger counties
in North Carolina and outliers. Essentially, the more drivers there are
in a county, the more suspensions that county has, with a few notable
exceptions.
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Figure 3. Suspended Drivers by County Population

For example, Wake County has the second-highest driver-aged
population and the most active suspensions. Mecklenburg County,
however, has the highest driver-aged population but only the sixthhighest number of suspensions. Tables 3 and 4 show the five highest
and five lowest counties for number of suspensions and the five most
and five least populous counties of driver-aged citizens and number of
suspensions, respectively. Appendix A includes these values for all one
hundred North Carolina counties, as well as the number of each type
of case and a racial breakdown for suspensions.
Table 3: Counties with Most and Fewest Actively Suspended
Drivers
County

Number of Suspensions

Wake

107,313

Guilford

74,441

Cumberland

62,406

Forsyth

56,861

Robeson

40,598

Alleghany

1,478

Clay

730

Pamlico

709

Hyde

685

Graham

681
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Table 4: Suspended Drivers in Counties with the Highest and
Lowest Driving Population

County

Counties with highest /
lowest 16yo+ population

Suspensions

Suspensions relative
to population

Mecklenburg

847,754

36,919

4.4%

Wake

842,324

107,313

10.7%

Guilford

422,903

74,441

17.6%

Forsyth

299,282

56,861

19.0%

Cumberland

259,106

62,406

24.1%

Camden

8,420

2,330

27.7%

Jones

8,032

2,225

27.7%

Graham

7,026

681

9.7%

Hyde

4,573

685

15.0%

Tyrrell

3,367

1496

44.4%

There is also much variation in the number of suspensions
compared to the driver-aged population. Table 5 lists the five highest
and five lowest counties for number of suspensions relative to their
driver-aged population. It is worth noting these values do not specify
the percentage of a given county that has suspended licenses because
our data do not specify whether a suspended individual currently
resides in that county. Thus, 44.4 percent of Tyrrell County residents
do not necessarily have a suspended license. Instead, we offer these
percentages as an estimate of how active each county is in suspending
licenses for FTAs and/or FTCs. Even still, Tyrrell County’s 44.4
percent represents a very high number of suspensions for what one
might expect given its population size and, in turn, resources.
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Table 5: Counties with the Highest and Lowest Percentage of
Suspensions Relative to Population
County

Suspensions relative to population

Tyrrell

44.4%

Robeson

39.4%

Vance

36.8%

Duplin

36.4%

Sampson

34.9%

Transylvania

7.7%

Lincoln

7.6%

Pamlico

6.5%

Mecklenburg

4.4%

Watauga

3.6%

E. Regression Results
We were primarily interested in the role of poverty and race in
predicting suspensions. We analyzed an MLM (“Model 1”) that
regressed the total number of people with a suspension in a county per
year onto the number of white individuals above the poverty line per
year, the number of white individuals below the poverty line per year,
the number of black individuals above the poverty line per year, and
the number of black individuals below the poverty line per year. We
also included as predictors the number of traffic stops in a county per
year and the number of traffic cases in a county per year to assess
whether traffic stops and traffic cases might account for variation in
suspensions by being “upstream” in the legal process. Full regression
table outputs are available in Appendix A.
First, we tested whether a county’s rate of traffic stops and traffic
cases plus racial disparity could explain the number of suspensions in
that county per year. Specifically, we used step-wise modeling to assess
a possible causal relationship between traffic stops, traffic cases, and
suspensions by comparing models that only include traffic stops as a
predictor (“Model A”), a model that uses only traffic stops and cases
(“Model B”), and the more complete Model 1. Each Model—A, then
B, then 1—had more predictor variables than the last, and at each
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“step” we compared the model fit and relationship between each
predictor to the previous model. For further analyses, we also created
Model 2, which was a simplified version of Model 1, containing the
race/poverty predictors but lacking the traffic-stops and traffic-cases
predictors. Note that for each model we used, the population of a given
county is included as a predictor in order to control for population size,
and “year” and “county” are included as random effects. Table 6
summarizes the factors in each model.
Table 6: Linear Mixed-Effects Model Descriptions
Model Name

Predictors

Outcome Variable(s)

Model A

Traffic Stops, Population

FTA Suspensions, FTC
Suspensions, Both
Suspensions

Model B

Traffic Stops, Traffic Cases,
Population

FTA Suspensions, FTC
Suspensions, Both
Suspensions

Model 1

Traffic Stops, Traffic Cases, Whites
Above Poverty, Whites Below
Poverty, Blacks Above Poverty,
Blacks Below Poverty, Population

FTA Suspensions, FTC
Suspensions, Both
Suspensions

Model 2

Whites Above Poverty, Whites
Below Poverty, Blacks Above
Poverty, Blacks Below Poverty,
Population

FTA Suspensions, FTC
Suspensions, Both
Suspensions

We predicted that if traffic stops and cases were responsible for
driving the numbers of suspensions per county, then we would observe
a significant positive coefficient for the number of traffic stops per
county per year (tested in Model A). Then, in a model containing
traffic stops and traffic cases (Model B), the coefficients for both
predictors would be positive, and traffic cases would diminish the
predictive power of traffic stops compared to Model A because not all
traffic stops would result in cases, but every suspension would be the
result of a case. Then, in a model with traffic stops, traffic cases, and
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poverty and race predictors (Model 1), traffic stops and cases would be
significant and race and poverty predictors would not.
In short, we did not observe support for this hypothesis. In the
interest of brevity, we do not include the entire models or an in-depth
discussion here; interested readers can find the output on OSF.
Although traffic stops were a positive predictor of suspensions in a
county in Model A, Model B yielded a negative coefficient for traffic
cases. That is, as the number of traffic cases in a county go up, the
number of predicted suspensions go down. This is a counterintuitive
finding and contrary to our predictions.116 Further, in Model 1, traffic
stops were not significant predictors of the number of suspensions
while traffic cases were, a finding in line with previous work in North
Carolina showing that while traffic stops are racially disparate, traffic
citations are not.117 Thus, we do not have support that traffic stops or
court cases are solely driving the number of suspensions in each county.
Comparing Model A to Model B and to Model 1 did not yield the
predicted trend in coefficients for traffic-stops and traffic-cases
predictors.
Next, we were interested in quantifying the relationship between
race, poverty, and suspensions in each county. Both Model 1 and
Model 2 included the race- and poverty-population predictors, but
because Model 2 has a slightly higher marginal R2,118 and coefficients
flip positive when traffic stops and cases are removed consistent with a
suppression effect,119 we focus our interpretation on Model 2. For each

116. This result weakly suggests counties that have more traffic cases may have better
methods of avoiding or treating FTA and FTC suspensions—perhaps because of more court
resources, greater court efficiency, or better access to defendant support services. This is,
however, speculative and in need of empirical support.
117. Frank R. Baumgartner, Derek A. Epp, Kelsey Shoub & Bayard Love, Targeting Young
Men of Color for Search and Arrest During Traffic Stops: Evidence from North Carolina, 2002–
2013, 5 POL., GROUPS & IDENTITIES 107, 113 (2016).
118. The R2 statistic calculates the amount of variation explained by the variables in the
model, with higher values corresponding to less unexplained variance, such as variables not
included in the model. Thus, higher R2 values indicate a better model fit. In MLM, marginal R2
refers to variance explained by the fixed effects only; conditional R2 refers to variance explained
by both the fixed and random effects.
119. See David P. MacKinnon, Jennifer L. Krull & Chondra M. Lockwood, Equivalence of
the Mediation, Confounding and Suppression Effect, 1 PREVENTION SCI. 173, 175 (2000) (“Within
a mediation model, a suppression effect would be present when the direct and mediated effects
of an independent variable on a dependent variable have opposite signs . . . .”); Joseph Tzelgov
& Avishai Henik, Suppression Situations in Psychological Research: Definitions, Implications, and
Applications, 109 PSYCHOL. BULL. 524, 525 (1991) (“[A] suppressor variable [is] one that
increases the validity of another variable by its inclusion in a regression equation.”).
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of the suspension types, we display results of a model that includes
black individuals above the poverty line, black individuals below the
poverty line, white individuals above the poverty line, and white
individuals below the poverty line,120 and county population as a
control variable. For this, we excluded both the traffic-stops predictor
(because it is not a significant predictor) and the traffic-case predictor,
and only included race–poverty combinations. Table 7 below illustrates
the results for Model 2, described in Appendix A, which focuses on the
race and poverty variables.
Table 7: Linear Mixed-Effects Regression Results for Model 2
FTA

FTC

Both

White Below

0.336
(0.0354)

0.150
(0.0366)

0.106a
(0.0133)

Black Below

0.049
(0.0105)

0.039*
(0.0127)

0.018
(0.0041)

White Above

0.207
(0.0215)

0.089
(0.0199)

0.056a
(0.0080)

Black Above

0.585
(0.0318)

0.187a
(0.0296)

0.080a
(0.0116)

Population

-0.131
(0.0136)

-0.055
(0.0127)

-0.028
(0.0052)

0.641 /
0.998

0.694 /
0.963

0.654 /
0.992

Marginal R2 /
Conditional R2

a

Note: Values are unstandardized regression coefficients with parenthetical standard
errors. Coefficients that share a superscript within a column are not significantly different
from each other at p = .05. *p = .002. All other values are significant at p < .001 level.

120. We did not include Latinx in our regression modeling because of incongruity between
census and AOC data. The census denotes Latinx as an ethnicity; AOC data records Latinx as a
race, without the same White-Latinx and Nonwhite-Latinx categories the census uses. Further,
blacks and whites represent over 90 percent of the North Carolina population.
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If poverty had nothing to do with suspensions and a person’s
nonpayment of a traffic fine is instead due to a willful decision not to
pay fees, race and poverty should have no bearing on the number of
FTC suspensions in a county. This, however, is not what we see. Those
above the poverty line increase the number of suspensions by a small
amount relative to other predictors—0.09 suspensions per white
person above the poverty line. White individuals below the poverty line
provide a slightly larger increase to suspensions—adding one white
person under the poverty line increases suspensions by 0.15. Thus, for
the white population, we see evidence that the number of white
individuals in poverty more strongly predicts FTC suspensions than
white individuals above the poverty line.
The results for black residents, however, paint a more complicated
picture. For FTC cases, we see a reversal of the trend for white
residents. Adding a black individual above the poverty line increases
the number of FTC suspensions in a county by 0.18; adding a black
individual below the poverty line increases suspensions by 0.03.
Despite being above the poverty line, the unimpoverished black
population may still be disproportionately affected by the financial
hardship of paying a fine, particularly compared to the white
population above the poverty line. Black individuals below the poverty
line, conversely, may have such a small effect because that population
is less likely to have a driver’s license, less likely to appear in traffic
court cases because they may not own a car, or may have access to
better legal services for indigent defendants.
One explanation for this relationship is that race is correlated with
a range of other social and economic disadvantages. For example,
researchers have observed interactions between race and poverty for
other outcomes, such as bankruptcy filings, in which poverty affects
whether a white person files under Chapter 13 or Chapter 7, but black
individuals both in and out of poverty tend to file under Chapter 13.121
121. Paul Kiel & Hannah Fresques, Data Analysis: Bankruptcy and Race in America,
PROPUBLICA (Sept. 27, 2017), https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/bankruptcy-dataanalysis#fn1 [https://perma.cc/HYU2-2SKH]. Whereas Chapter 7 wipes out debt but allows
debtors to acquire filers’ assets, Chapter 13 allows filers to retain assets—such as a car or house—
provided they make scheduled payments for several years. Paul Kiel & Hannah Fresques, How
the Bankruptcy System Is Failing Black Americans, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 27, 2017) [hereinafter
Kiel
&
Fresques,
How
the
Bankruptcy
System
Is
Failing],
https://features.propublica.org/bankruptcy-inequality/bankruptcy-failing-black-americans-debtchapter-13 [https://perma.cc/FM4Y-D2RM]. For filers with few assets, Chapter 7 can provide
much-needed permanent relief quickly. Id. Conversely, filers with few assets using Chapter 13 can
often end up in the same situation after failing to keep up with payments. Id. Because people of
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In a band of southern states, including North Carolina, consumers
filing for bankruptcy predominantly use Chapter 13, which does not
allow people to wipe out their debt and retain their limited resources;
Chapter 13 filing rates are particularly high in majority-black zip
codes.122 It is possible that a number of economic factors disparately
associated with race could be influencing this trend as well, such as
black individuals below the poverty line not being able to afford cars
and thus driving less or not having drivers’ licenses in the first place. It
is also possible that the majority of black individuals not in poverty are
not provided the same economic buffer as white individuals above the
poverty line. That is, the black population above the poverty line likely
does not have the same wealth as the white population above the
poverty line, and may thus be hit harder by the financial hardship of
needing to pay a fine.
Indeed, work on the racial income gap has found that poverty
looks different for black and white families, and the gap is not merely
a result of present income. For example, whereas a white family just
above the poverty line may have around $18,000 in wealth, a similarly
situated black family has closer to zero dollars in wealth, or even
negative wealth.123 The analysis of 2016 driver’s license suspensions in
New York by the Fines and Fees Justice Center found the same
pattern, in which poverty was connected with suspensions for white but
not black populations.124 Further research should examine what may
be driving these effects.
Analysis of FTA suspensions show the same trend as FTC
suspensions. White individuals below the poverty line (0.34) and black
individuals above the poverty line (0.58) are most strongly associated
with more FTA suspensions. Black individuals below the poverty line,
although a significant predictor, are only weakly related to higher FTA
suspensions (0.05). These results suggest that the same race- and
poverty-related factors drive the population of people who have
driver’s license suspensions for FTAs in traffic court as for failure to
pay traffic fines and fees—namely, that people may not be appearing
color often have fewer assets, Chapter 13 may not be the best option for them, but many end up
filing Chapter 13 on their attorney’s advice. Id.
122. Kiel & Fresques, How the Bankruptcy System Is Failing, supra note 121.
123. WILLIAM DARITY JR. ET AL., SAMUEL DUBOIS COOK CTR. ON SOC. EQUITY & INSIGHT
CTR. FOR CMTY. ECON. DEV., WHAT WE GET WRONG ABOUT CLOSING THE RACIAL WEALTH
GAP 2 (2018), https://insightcced.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Where-We-Went-WrongCOMPLETE-REPORT-July-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PNJ-FRJ4].
124. Weiss & Wilner, supra note 107.
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in court because of the financial cost. However, the predictive value of
each race–poverty combination is greater than its FTC counterpart,
suggesting that this may be where much of the suspension “action” is.
This could be due to more individuals being unaware their licenses are
being suspended for an FTA than an FTC. It may also be that
individuals who know they cannot afford court costs decide not to
appear in court, thereby incurring an FTA instead of an FTC.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL, POLICY, AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
THESE FINDINGS
As described in Part III, driver’s license suspensions are extremely
widespread in North Carolina, affecting one in seven adult drivers and
particularly associated at the county level with both whites below the
poverty line and blacks above the poverty line. This next Part turns to
the implications of these findings for policy, practice, and constitutional
litigation. Although there are real constitutional and policy concerns
with the practice in North Carolina, there are no easy answers to the
policy problem posed by such suspensions, particularly given the vast
scale of the practice.
A. Implications for Policy and Practice
Drivers have a protected liberty and property interest in their
licenses, which if issued by the state, cannot be revoked or suspended
“without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”125 The patterns described raise constitutional questions
concerning both the degree of procedural due process provided before
taking the step of suspending a driver’s license as well as inequality in
outcomes, given the demographic data presented. Recent litigation
challenging driver’s license suspensions for fines-and-fees-related
reasons includes cases in California,126 Michigan,127 Mississippi,128

125. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
126. Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, Hernandez v. Cal. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, No. RG16836460 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 25,
2016), http://ebclc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Hernandez-et-al-v.-CA-DMV-Complaint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N5EN-AFTS]; ACLU Press Release, supra note 19.
127. Fowler v. Benson, 924 F.3d 247 (6th Cir. 2019) (reversing and remanding a district court’s
grant of a preliminary injunction enjoining Michigan from enforcing its driver’s license suspension
scheme).
128. Press Release, S. Poverty Law Ctr., SPLC Reaches Agreement with Mississippi To
Reinstate over 100,000 Driver’s Licenses Suspended for Non-Payment of Fines (Dec. 19, 2017),
https://www.splcenter.org/news/2017/12/19/splc-reaches-agreement-mississippi [https://perma.cc/
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Montana,129 Tennessee,130 Virginia,131 and Washington.132 The
Tennessee case recently resulted in a finding that, absent an
opportunity to demonstrate indigence, the state practice violated the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.133 The ruling has been
vacated as moot due to enactment of new legislation in Tennessee,
providing a procedure to inquire into ability to pay.134 The district judge
had called the practice “powerfully counterproductive.”135 The judge
explained:
If a person has no resources to pay a debt, he cannot be threatened or
cajoled into paying it; he may, however, become able to pay it in the
future. But taking his driver’s license away sabotages that prospect.
For one thing, the lack of a driver’s license substantially limits one’s
ability to obtain and maintain employment. Even aside from the
effect on employment, however, the inability to drive introduces new
obstacles, risks, and costs to a wide array of life activities, as the
former driver is forced into a daily ordeal of logistical triage to
compensate for his inadequate transportation. In short, losing one’s
driver’s license simultaneously makes the burdens of life more
expensive and renders the prospect of amassing the resources needed
to overcome those burdens more remote.136

The judge noted that where many drivers with a suspended license
continue to drive, they may face further prosecution and further fines
YR6E-XGEP].
129. Class Action Complaint, DiFrancesco v. Bullock, No. CV-17-66-BU-SEH (D. Mont.
Aug. 31, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/ttwzjvo [https://perma.cc/GCG6-KSWF]; Angela Brandt,
Lawsuit Alleges Montana Discriminates Against Drivers Too Poor To Pay Fines, INDEP. REC.
(Sept.
6,
2017),
https://helenair.com/news/crime-and-courts/lawsuit-alleges-montanadiscriminates-against-drivers-too-poor-to-pay/article_a5c72474-b911-562c-84c5-78b7ce4ec9e8.html
[https://perma.cc/V6EN-WQ44].
130. Thomas v. Haslam, 329 F. Supp. 3d 475 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) (following class certification,
finding that driver’s license revocation violated due process and equal protection rights), vacated
as moot sub nom. Thomas v. Lee, 776 F. App’x 910 (6th Cir. 2019).
131. Stinnie v. Holcomb, 396 F. Supp. 3d 653 (W.D. Va. 2019) (staying proceedings in light of
a budget-amendment enactment eliminating driver’s license suspensions). The Department of
Justice filed a statement of interest in this litigation. Statement of Interest of the United States,
Stinnie, 396 F. Supp. 3d 653 (No. 3:16-CV-00044), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/909301/download [https://perma.cc/6L6P-3Y8F].
132. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Fuentes v. Benton County, No. 15-202976-1
(Wash.
Super.
Ct.
Oct.
6,
2015),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/
files/field_document/fuentes_v._benton_county_-_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/WXG4-23K7].
133. Haslam, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 494.
134. Lee, 776 F. App’x at 911.
135. Haslam, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 483.
136. Id. at 483–84.
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for doing so.137 Thus, “[court] debt leads to a license revocation; the
revocation leads to another conviction, this time for driving on a
revoked license; the new conviction creates more debt; and the cycle
begins again, with the driver, who was already indigent, only deeper in
. . . a debt spiral.”138 The causes and effects of this spiral are financial:
people who cannot afford to pay an initial fine end up with more fines
they cannot afford to pay. That said, the response to the ruling was
telling: Tennessee amended its statute to provide additional process to
determine indigency prerevocation, and in response, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals vacated the lower court judgment as moot.139
Whether that statutory change results in improved outcomes remains
to be seen.
What is the preferred judicial remedy for an unconstitutional
driver’s license suspension scheme? One policy approach, as adopted
in Tennessee140 and intended to address that constitutional problem, is
to require judges to conduct an inquiry into ability to pay before
imposing a fine or a consequence for failing to pay the fine.141 Thus, a
person who refuses to pay a fine that is set at an affordable level would
still receive a driver’s license suspension, while a person who cannot
pay would not and might receive some alternative sanction. However,
judges must conduct that inquiry carefully, and ability to pay must be
defined in a realistic manner. Some states have adopted procedures, as
well as judicial bench cards and checklists, to guide such ability-to-pay
hearings.142 Brief hearings in traffic courts that have large dockets may
not give judges good opportunities to fairly assess a person’s ability to

137. Id. at 484.
138. Id.
139. Lee, 776 F. App’x at 911 (citing the enactment of 2019 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 438, which
adopted an indigency exception to the state’s license suspension scheme).
140. See id.
141. BETH A. COLGAN, HAMILTON PROJECT, ADDRESSING MODERN DEBTORS’ PRISONS
WITH GRADUATED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS THAT DEPEND ON ABILITY TO PAY 13 (2019).
142. See, e.g., NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE FAMILY COURT JUDGES, STATE JUSTICE INST.
& NAT’L JUVENILE DEF. CTR., ENSURING YOUNG PEOPLE ARE NOT CRIMINALIZED FOR
POVERTY: BAIL, FEES, FINES, COSTS, AND RESTITUTION IN JUVENILE COURT (2018),
https://njdc.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Bail-Fines-and-Fees-Bench-Card_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S9NL-5JTH] (“This bench card . . . provides guidance for judges on how to
exercise their discretion to alleviate harm and support youth on pathways to success.”); NAT’L
TASK FORCE ON FINES, FEES & BAIL PRACTICES, LAWFUL COLLECTION OF LEGAL FINANCIAL
OBLIGATIONS: A BENCH CARD FOR JUDGES (2017), https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/
articles/lawful-collection-of-legal-financial-obligations-a-bench-card-for-judges [https://perma.cc/
RW5N-MP4C] (setting guidelines for courts in sanctioning indigent defendants for nonpayment
of court fines and fees).
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pay a fine.143 Payment schedules designed to accommodate people with
limited ability to pay can use sliding scales grounded in actual income,
with mechanisms for adjustment based on individual factors.144 Each of
these approaches raise challenges in implementation. For example,
litigants may not have ready access to detailed documentation
concerning their income or resources; judges may need to rely on
convenient proxies, such as public-assistance documentation.145
One central limitation of such constitutional challenges is not only
that they may take time and expense to litigate and that court orders
must be enforced over time, but also that the focus of such litigation is
necessarily narrow. Where federal constitutional doctrine focuses on
the situation in which a person is criminally punished based on
indigency, constitutional challenges have focused on people who
cannot afford to pay—and fail to pay—fines and fees, resulting in loss
of driving privileges. A class action was recently filed in North Carolina
challenging FTC-related driver’s license suspensions on due process
and equal protection grounds, among others.146 Such cases do not
address FTA suspensions. However, our research suggests that it is
much more important in states like North Carolina, in which FTA cases
are far more numerous, to focus on those FTA cases. As a result, policy
approaches that do not rely purely on litigation may be highly
desirable.
B. Better Understanding Failures to Appear
Although the bulk of driver’s license suspensions in North
Carolina are denoted as FTAs, less attention has been paid to such
cases as a matter of policy, and less is known about the causes of FTAs.
One possibility is that people want to avoid interactions with the court
system and law enforcement. Indeed, we do see a much larger
overrepresentation of Latinx individuals with FTAs than FTCs (Table
1)—a population that may avoid contact due to deportation concerns.
However, logic suggests that while some may not show up to court for

143. See, e.g., Theresa Zhen, (Color)Blind Reform: How Ability-To-Pay Determinations Are
Inadequate To Transform a Racialized System of Penal Debt, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
175, 201–03 (2019) (“The nature of the human condition is so nuanced that no finite set of
questions can accurately determine a person’s past, present, and future circumstances.”).
144. Beth A. Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions According to Ability To Pay, 103 IOWA
L. REV. 53, 74–96 (2017).
145. See id. at 61–65 (discussing how “to effectively capture and employ valid financial data”).
146. Johnson v. Jessup, 381 F. Supp. 3d 619, 623 (M.D.N.C.) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ due
process and equal protection claims), appeal filed, No. 19-1421 (4th Cir. Apr. 19, 2019).
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problematic reasons, such as willful avoidance of court obligations,
there are also potential financial and indigency-related causes for
failing to appear. For example, a person may know they cannot afford
to pay a fine and thus not go to court. Someone who cannot afford to
take a day off work lest they lose their job or who cannot afford
childcare also may not appear. Our regression results support this
point: the effects of race and poverty are extremely similar between the
population of those with an FTC and those with an FTA (Table 7).
Additionally, given the huge number of FTAs in North Carolina,
it may be that many suspensions are not due to intentional lawlessness
but rather due to ignorance of the suspension in the first place. In North
Carolina, residents are notified of their court dates and subsequent
FTA by physical mail to the address in AOC’s database,147 unless they
register for a text-based system that was established in late 2018.148 It is
hard to know how many of the mail addresses are accurate, but there
is evidence that quite a few addresses are inaccurate and will not
receive mail addressed to the person in question.149 In our discussions
with public defenders and policy advocates while conducting this
research, many expressed doubt that addresses are correct.150 If that is
a contributor to the problem, then a policy solution would be to
improve notification systems by relying on texts or more up-to-date
address information. If instead people fail to appear because of
practical challenges tied to lack of transportation, then courtsupported transportation solutions may be needed.
Courts treat FTAs and FTCs differently based on constitutional
doctrine that has focused on punishments disproportionately imposed
on those who cannot pay—and in some cases that focus may be
warranted. However, there also exists a strong possibility that a similar
cause—financial hardship—underlies both charges. More information

147. Karima Modjadidi, Brandon L. Garrett & William Crozier, Undeliverable: Suspended
Driver’s Licenses and the Problem of Notice, UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 4–5), https://tinyurl.com/tgbfmur [https://perma.cc/Y2WB-TU6D].
148. North Carolina has initiated a text-based court notification system. Press Release, N.C.
Judicial Branch, Court Date Notifications and Reminders for Criminal Cases Now Available Via
Text and Email (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.nccourts.gov/news/tag/press-release/court-datenotifications-and-reminders-for-criminal-cases-now-available-via-text-and-email [https://perma.cc/
VT5Q-FW4D].
149. Modjadidi, Garrett & Crozier, supra note 147, at 4 (describing a survey in Wake County,
North Carolina, of persons with active driver’s license suspensions and finding that over one-third
had mail returned).
150. Email from Emily E. Mistr, Wake Cty. Pub. Def. Office, to the authors (Sept. 28, 2019)
(on file with authors).
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on the causes of FTAs and the extent of overlap between the causes of
FTAs and FTCs is necessary to better design policy responding to this
problem. If for some groups of people, FTCs and FTAs are a
distinction without a difference, policy interventions should be
addressed to both groups and both legal mechanisms that result in
driver’s license suspensions.
C. Financial Incentives and Policy
It is possible that the wide breadth of suspensions in North
Carolina are not based directly on racial and economic factors, but
instead enforcement due to budgetary considerations. Interestingly,
such policies may not be as effective as one might suspect at raising
revenue; after all, many indigent people cannot pay, and some
jurisdictions spend more trying to collect than they ultimately
recover.151 Previous work has explored how policing, particularly
targeted at vulnerable, poor communities, can help turn a profit for
local government and police agencies.152 Perhaps the most famous
example is Ferguson, Missouri, in which citizens who cannot pay fines
for crimes—the same fines that underlie the suspensions we describe
here—were imprisoned and their debt sold by the city to private
collection companies.153 So common was this practice that court fines
and fees were Ferguson’s second-largest source of income in 2013.154
Unlike in Missouri, court fines and fees do not directly result in
additional funding for local police agencies or governments in North
Carolina, but they are, in part, nevertheless directed to local
government. Instead, North Carolina has long adopted a
constitutionally unified court system, in which court salaries and
operational costs are paid via state funds.155 Dating back to the 1875
state constitution, court fines are directed to a state fund that supports

151. MATTHEW MENENDEZ, MICHAEL F. CROWLEY, LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN & NOAH
ATCHISON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE STEEP COSTS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES AND
FINES 5 (2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/steep-costs-criminaljustice-fees-and-fines [https://perma.cc/VS5K-DELX].
152. Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, Political Economy at Any Speed: What
Determines Traffic Citations?, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 509, 509 (2009).
153. DOJ INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 79, at 2–6.
154. Policing and Profit, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1723, 1724 (2015).
155. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 20 (“The General Assembly shall provide for the establishment
of a schedule of court fees and costs which shall be uniform throughout the State within each
division of the General Court of Justice. The operating expenses of the judicial department . . .
shall be paid from State funds.”).
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public schools.156 However, the funds are retained by the county in
which the fines are imposed, and localities may offset the funds they
receive for schools.157 Court costs are a bit more complicated, and while
they do sometimes go to a state fund that supports court agencies, they
are also distributed to other state groups and funds not directly
involved in court administration.158 Further, a recent analysis of fines
and forfeitures in California city governments found that budgetary
considerations and public-safety factors did not predict reliance on
fines and forfeitures.159 Rather, racial composition of both the
population and the police force did.160 However, a study of North
Carolina traffic tickets found that, from 1990 to 2003, more traffic
infractions were issued in the year following a decline in revenue—and
that the growth did not stall once revenue increased.161 This suggests
that despite the fine structure in North Carolina, there may be a
“profitable policing” motive underlying ticketing and, by extension,
these suspensions.
Even if the goal is to secure payment of traffic fines statewide, it is
unclear how effective suspensions are as a deterrent against
nonpayment of traffic fines. In North Carolina, at least 25 percent of
people with a suspended license have a DWLR charge (Table 2)—but
this is based just on DWLR data from 2013–2017, so the total is likely

156. David M. Lawrence, Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures: An Historical and Comparative
Analysis, 65 N.C. L. REV. 49, 57–58 (1986). The state constitution provides for the allocation of
these funds directly to local government:
[A]ll moneys, stocks, bonds, and other property belonging to a county school fund, and
the clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures and of all fines collected in the several
counties for any breach of the penal laws of the State, shall belong to and remain in the
several counties, and shall be faithfully appropriated and used exclusively for
maintaining free public schools.
N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 7.
157. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 7.
158. Shea Denning, We Are NOT Ferguson, N.C. CRIM. L. (Apr. 16, 2015, 11:13 AM),
https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/we-are-not-ferguson [https://perma.cc/8V5U-Q2RK]; see also
2017 Court Costs, N.C. JUD. BRANCH (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.nccourts.gov/documents/
publications/2017-court-costs [https://perma.cc/4UNT-ZBFS] (providing a breakdown of court
costs).
159. Akheil Singla, Charlotte Kirschner & Samuel B. Stone, Race, Representation, and
Revenue: Reliance on Fines and Forfeitures in City Governments, URB. AFF. REV. ONLINEFIRST,
Mar.
2019,
at
1,
3,
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1078087419834632
[https://perma.cc/EZB5-DTJP].
160. Id.
161. Thomas A. Garrett & Gary A. Wagner, Red Ink in the Rearview Mirror: Local Fiscal
Conditions and the Issuance of Traffic Tickets, 52 J.L. & ECON. 71, 72 (2009).
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be far larger,162 and these are only the drivers who had been pulled over
after the initial suspension. People continue to drive without their
license, suggesting that the risk of a DWLR is outweighed by the costs
of losing mobility. Given the widespread financial and personal costs
of not driving, such decision-making is understandable. Because of the
overrepresentation of people of color and the strong correlation
between suspensions and poverty, this Article’s findings reiterate what
has been found in other states: these policies disproportionately affect
vulnerable and minority communities.
D. Legislative Efforts
Legislative approaches have the benefit of not depending on
implementation of a decree entered in litigation. In recent years,
several states have adopted laws removing automatic driver’s license
suspension provisions. In response to growing awareness of the costs
of driver’s license suspensions, many jurisdictions have reconsidered
the use of laws requiring suspensions for non-driving-related offenses,
including through statutes, administrative actions, and government
programs. In 2016, the Department of Justice recommended in a Dear
Colleague Letter that state and local courts avoid using suspension as
a debt-collection tool.163 California eliminated such suspensions by
statute in 2017, as noted.164 Washington, D.C., has enacted legislation
to end driver’s license suspension for failure to pay fines and fees,165 as

162. We have made a request to the North Carolina AOC for all DWLR data, going back
farther in time, but as of this writing have not yet received these data.
163. Dear Colleague Letter, Vanita Gupta & Lisa Foster, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Fines and Fees in State and Local Courts 7 n.9 (Mar. 14, 2016),
https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/content/uploads/2018/11/Dear-Colleague-letter.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2YJ2-8S5B]. DOJ relied in part on research studies regarding the societal impact of
these laws. The DOJ letter cited to a study of suspended drivers in New Jersey, which found that
42 percent of people lost their jobs as a result of the driver’s license suspension, that 45 percent
could not find another job, and that this had the greatest impact on seniors and low-income
individuals. Id. at 7 n.8 (citing ALAN M. VOORHEES TRANSP. CTR. & N.J. MOTOR VEHICLE
COMM’N, MOTOR VEHICLES AFFORDABILITY AND FAIRNESS TASK FORCE: FINAL REPORT xii
(2006), https://www.state.nj.us/mvc/pdf/about/AFTF_final_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6V4EZUV]).
164. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
165. Traffic and Parking Ticket Penalty Amendment Act of 2018, 65 D.C. Reg. 9546 (Sept.
14, 2018).
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has Maine.166 Missouri,167 Washington,168 and Vermont169 have limited
the circumstances in which license suspension can occur and have
capped suspension time periods. Legislation to end suspensions for
non-driving-related offenses is presently under consideration in New
York.170
The “Next Step Act” legislation introduced in North Carolina in
2019 would limit suspensions to one year for failure-to-pay cases.171 The
Act would require that, for people facing suspensions for a failure to
pay, “there [be] a court finding at sentencing that the person is able to
pay and the license should be suspended if the person fails to pay.”172
Further, even for such suspensions, the suspension would be limited to
twelve months.173 This legislation would provide improved process and
a defined suspension period for FTC cases. However, the Act would
not address the problems with FTAs, making it an incomplete response
to the overall body of suspensions, the vast majority of which, as
described, consist of FTAs. Nor would the legislation be retroactive; its
text does not speak to any such retroactive application, and as a result,
it would not affect the large numbers of current suspensions.
This retroactivity problem highlights a challenge nationally, where
millions of adult drivers have suspensions. Even the enactment of more
comprehensive legislation, which can alter fines-and-fees practices
statewide, may not address how to restore driving privileges and
address debt for millions of individuals affected by the statutes and
practices that have been in place in the past. Indeed, even retroactive
legislation would still require individuals to return to the DMV and
reapply for a license. To provide individuals with notice to do so may
be a challenge, given problems with outdated address information. Our
research suggests that localized, service-oriented efforts may be

166. An Act Regarding Driver’s License Suspensions for Nondriving-Related Violations,
2018 Me. Laws ch. 462.
167. MO. REV. STAT. § 302.341 (2019) (limiting the scope of driver’s license suspensions for
nonpayment to nonminor moving traffic violations).
168. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.289 (2019) (ending suspension of driver’s licenses for
nonpayment of fines or fees for nonmoving traffic violations).
169. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 1109 (2019) (limiting the time period of driver’s license
suspension to thirty days).
170. Assemb. B. 7463A, 2019–2020 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 5348A, 2019–2020
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
171. Next Step Act, H.B. 988, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2019).
172. Id. § 1(a) (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-24.1(a)(2)).
173. Id. (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-24.1(b)(5)).
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needed to inform individuals of their rights and assist them in restoring
driving privileges.
E. Local Policy Efforts
Localized efforts have focused on providing services to assist
individuals with restoring their rights, even if fines have been waived
and their privileges restored. Such efforts may be very important
because, as we have described, individuals with suspended licenses
often do not appear in court and may not be easy to reach. They may
distrust courts, be wary of legal notices, and fear that they cannot pay
fees to restore rights or fear consequences of participation in legal
processes. For those reasons, local efforts have focused on informing
people with suspended driver’s licenses of their ability to restore
licenses and providing resources to assist them in that process.174
Several states have programs designed to help people resolve overdue
payment of fines or cure FTAs.175 In Durham, North Carolina, as part
of a pilot program, the Durham Expungement and Restoration
(“DEAR”) program, the district attorney dismissed 2,500 charges for
eligible individuals with suspended driver’s licenses in June 2018 and
dismissed another six hundred cases in January 2019, with additional
dismissal dockets conducted every two weeks.176 For context, Durham
174. KATHERINE FITZGERALD & MICHAEL GRISWOLD, MECKLENBURG COUNTY DRIVER
LICENSE
RESTORATION
CLINIC
PILOT
SUMMARY
3–5
(2016),
https://www.mecknc.gov/CriminalJusticeServices/Documents/Other%20Publications/DLRC%2
0Statistical%20Summary_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/24FM-NMWH]; Katherine Kershaw, Law
Students Help with Driver’s License Restoration and Immigration over Spring Break, UNCCHAPEL HILL U. NEWS (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.unc.edu/posts/2018/03/23/pro-bonostudents-help-with-drivers-license-restoration-and-immigration-over-spring-break
[https://perma.cc/T985-7A4D]; Kristen Powers, Clean Slate Success in Durham, SOUTHERN
COALITION FOR SOC. JUST. (May 1, 2014), https://www.southerncoalition.org/clean-slate-successdurham [https://perma.cc/MUJ9-DEW7]; Greensboro Driver’s License Restoration Clinic, N.C.
PRO
BONO
RESOURCE
CTR.,
https://ncprobono.org/volunteergreensboro
[https://perma.cc/VD3L-SLQF].
175. See, e.g., HELENA GARDNER, DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSIONS AND DRIVING WITH A
LICENSE
SUSPENDED
IN
VERMONT:
BACKGROUND
2
(2016),
https://legislature.vermont.gov/Documents/2016/WorkGroups/House%20Judiciary/Bills/H.571/
W~Helena%20Gardner~License%20Suspensions%20in%20Vermont~1-7-2016.pdf [https://
perma.cc/SWK4-36RF] (Vermont); Moyer, supra note 91 (Charlottesville, Virginia); CAP –
Compliance Assistance Program, CITY OF PHX., https://www.phoenix.gov/court/cap
[https://perma.cc/K4YH-VBWM] (Phoenix, Arizona); Relicensing Program, SPOKANE CITY,
https://my.spokanecity.org/courts/prosecutor/relicensing
[https://perma.cc/9G5X-4VX7]
(Spokane, Washington).
176. Derrick Lewis, Durham DA Dismisses Traffic Charges for 500 People, CBS17.COM (July
1, 2018, 9:36 PM), https://www.cbs17.com/news/local-news/durham-county-news/durham-dadismisses-traffic-charges-for-500-people [https://perma.cc/CST9-P7S6]; Sarah Willets, Durham
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County had 40,500 suspensions,177 which may not include the 2,500
dismissals in 2018 if they were resolved quickly. The program, a
collaboration between the city of Durham, the court, the North
Carolina Justice Center, Legal Aid, local law schools, and others, is
housed in an office at the courthouse, and it provides free help to
clients with driver’s license restoration, expungements, and certificates
of relief.178 Thus, one additional local response to the growing numbers
of these suspensions would be for prosecutors to use their discretion to
dismiss such charges on a larger scale. Even such an approach,
however, requires efforts to inform people of that relief, and then work
with them to formally restore driving privileges through the state
DMV.
F. Future Directions in Addressing Driver’s License Suspensions
This Article provides a largely descriptive analysis that is not
intended to advocate for any particular policy or legislative solutions.
However, it has emphasized in its discussion of policy approaches that
any response to these suspensions, which currently affect millions of
people across the country, will likely need to be multifaceted in any
jurisdiction. As this Article shows, many individuals have either FTAs
or FTCs, and some have both. Although some changes may be effective
in reducing FTC suspensions, such as litigation approaches or efforts
requiring judges to conduct an ability-to-pay inquiry, FTAs are likely
much more challenging because, logically, one cannot waive fees in
court if a person does not appear in court. Legislative approaches could
address such FTAs. More structural solutions to court processes, such
as facilitating transportation to court or online payment of fines, based
on ability to pay, might also be successful. We have separately
documented a problem that individuals may fail to receive notice by
mail of driver’s license suspensions; still additional policy should be
directed toward ensuring actual notice of these serious outcomes.179
Given the large number of suspensions, changing practices or law
going forward will not address the large number of existing
suspensions, for which local efforts and social-services approaches may

County Dismisses Hundreds of Traffic Fines as Part of a License Restoration Effort, INDY WEEK
(Jan. 15, 2019, 2:12 PM), https://indyweek.com/news/durham/durham-county-dismisseshundreds-of-traffic-fines [https://perma.cc/8HYU-MSE3].
177. See infra Appendix B.
178. Willets, supra note 176.
179. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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be needed. Further, even if a change is made retroactive or old charges
are dismissed by prosecutors, comprehensively notifying those affected
would itself be a challenging process. For the same reasons that
individuals who are indigent faced difficulty appearing in traffic court,
they may face difficulties with the DMV process for restoring a license,
which would involve further applications, waiting, and fees. Serviceoriented restoration efforts are therefore an important component of
any effort to reduce driver’s license suspensions in any community.
Such restoration efforts would require tailoring to the financially
burdened, primarily minority populations that make up the majority of
North Carolina citizens with suspended licenses.
Successful reform also requires a better understanding of the
causes of driver’s license suspensions, population-level characteristics
of those with suspended licenses, and the impact of having a suspended
license on individuals’ lives. Each of those issues will be the subject of
further empirical research. Though illustrative, these data do not
complete the entire picture of driver’s license suspensions. It is worth
a reminder that these data are all correlational, preventing causal
inferences—for example, that poverty causes higher rates of license
suspensions. Further, because data were analyzed at an aggregate,
county level, we cannot draw conclusions about individual-level factors
for suspensions, such as whether being black puts you at a higher risk
for having an active suspension. But even though the data do paint a
clear picture of racial disparity in suspensions and the analyses point to
a complicated race–poverty interaction, they do not provide an
underlying mechanism or cause.
We note that driving distances to jobs have increased over the past
two decades, and there is evidence that residents of higher-poverty
neighborhoods have experienced even greater declines in job
proximity.180 Future research should further examine not only the
connection between race, poverty rates, and driver’s license
suspensions, but also the geography of driver’s license suspension.
This Article’s findings and limitations in the data and analyses
point to further areas of research. Perhaps the most important missing
piece here are analyses at the individual, rather than county-year, level.
Data that include cured and active suspensions, as well as economic

180. ELIZABETH KNEEBONE & NATALIE HOLMES, METRO. POLICY PROGRAM AT
BROOKINGS, THE GROWING DISTANCE BETWEEN PEOPLE AND JOBS IN METROPOLITAN
AMERICA
1
(2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Srvy_
JobsProximity.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WPA-4CJY].
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data such as employment and income, would more clearly reveal any
relationship between race, poverty, and suspension status. Specifically,
how these factors predict whether a suspension is active or cured would
illustrate the effectiveness of suspensions as debt-collection tools and
individual-level risk factors for remaining suspended.181
Another approach for analyzing such data would be a more indepth analysis of county-level factors that predict the number of
suspensions. Here, because driver’s license suspension policies in
North Carolina are statewide, we chose to assign county-year as a
random effect to analyze statewide trends. However, that random
effect naturally encompasses a great deal of variation between
counties. County-level variation in population density, policing,
neighborhood and racial dispersion, court and police resources,
employment, public transportation, and commute times all likely
contribute to variation in how suspensions are enforced. Examination
of these factors may yield trends that suggest more tailored outcomes
and needed policy reforms for each county.
Beyond the status of suspensions, we need further data on how
suspensions affect people’s day-to-day lives. Although previous reports
have found people suffer from lost jobs, financial difficulties, and
mounting, unpayable debts,182 the ability to quantify these effects and
directly link them to individual risk factors would paint a clearer
picture of the true effect of these suspension policies. Interview and
survey methods could explore why people do not appear in court or
pay their fines, providing empirical evidence for both the causes and
effects of suspended driver’s licenses.
CONCLUSION
This Article reviews the extant empirical literature on driver’s
license suspensions and then examines driver’s license suspension data
from North Carolina. We find that there are 1,225,000 active driver’s
license suspensions in North Carolina with 827,000 for failure to
appear, 263,000 for failure to comply, and 135,000 for both. This
constitutes about 15 percent of all adult drivers in the state. We
describe the demographics of the people subject to active suspensions
and examine variation in county-level imposition of such suspensions.

181.
182.

We are presently pursuing such an analysis of North Carolina FTC data.
See, e.g., ALEX BENDER ET AL., supra note 92, at 6–8; see also CARNEGIE, IMPACTS AND
FAIRNESS STUDY, supra note 86, at 3, 8.
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We detail how neither the volume of traffic stops nor the size of traffic
court dockets can explain the observed disparities. We also report data
on further prosecution for driving with a revoked license in North
Carolina.
We set out a range of policy responses to these driver’s license
suspensions. We suggest that driver’s license suspensions for nondriving-related reasons do not accomplish the policy goal of ensuring
payment of fines and fees but rather exacerbate poverty and impose
negative economic consequences on individuals and communities.
However, we suggest that constitutional challenges are an incomplete
response since they only focus on punishments directed at those unable
to pay fees, and therefore the remedies may focus solely on ability-topay hearings and not on failures to appear. Failures to appear in court
are a central part of the policy problem identified, but responses to
nonappearance may be different, in part because they may implicate
different underlying causes, including insufficient methods for
notifications from the court and lack or loss of access to transportation.
What can be done to address this problem? The most
straightforward path, adopted in several states in recent years, would
be to eliminate driver’s license suspension as an “incentive” for
appearing in court and paying fines. Ideally, jurisdictions should do so
retroactively, clearing dated suspensions. Barring a jurisdiction-wide
solution, states should improve communication, such as by issuing
notices in a method other than by mail and being proactive regarding
failed communication. States should make efforts to reduce the
number of suspensions put in place by having more mechanisms for
assessing ability to pay at hearings and consideration of individual
circumstances. In addition, states can limit the impact of suspensions,
including by capping the duration of such suspensions. States should
also support restoration efforts, including by actively notifying
suspended drivers and/or automatically restoring driving privileges. As
described, although litigation or legislation can prospectively address
both FTC and FTA cases statewide, such legal changes may not
effectively retrospectively address the millions of prior suspensions
that exist in many states, like North Carolina. Social services at the
local level may assist individuals to restore driving privileges.
It is a comparatively recent phenomenon that states suspend
millions of adult drivers’ privileges indefinitely for failure to pay traffic
tickets and other non-driving-related reasons. The story this Article
tells is one of unintended consequences: federal funding tied to driver’s
license suspension as a condition of receipt of highway and other funds
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in order to recoup child support and punish drug offenders. Yet,
driver’s license suspensions exploded as states like North Carolina
incorporated suspension data into electronic court-records systems and
turned temporary suspensions into indefinite ones that can persist for
years and even decades. What began as a system for collecting court
debt may instead reinforce poverty. The resulting problem of driver’s
licenses suspension is so large scale and deep rooted that it will require
a multifaceted policy response. Given the paucity of prior research and
the complexity of the problem, this Article emphasizes that important
questions remain for future research that could inform constitutional
litigation, local restoration efforts, dismissals of charges, and legislative
efforts to restore licenses and end the suspension of driver’s licenses
for non-driving-related traffic offenses. Constitutional challenges to
driver’s license suspensions, legislative efforts, and community efforts
have all enjoyed growing success in recent years. The story of driver’s
license suspension in North Carolina can hopefully inform the
sustained efforts that will be required to undo large-scale driver’s
license suspension in the United States.
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Appendix A: Modeling Explanation, Tests, and Output
Variable

Description

Source

Traffic stops

Count of traffic stops in a county, per year

NC State Bureau of
Investigation

Traffic cases

Count of traffic cases in a county, per year

AOC (via Charlotte
Observer)

Whites below poverty

Count of 16yo+ whites below poverty line in a
US Census Website
county, per year

Blacks below poverty

Count of 16yo+ blacks below poverty line in a
US Census Website
county, per year

Whites above poverty

Count of 16yo+ whites above poverty line in a
US Census Website
county, per year

Whites below poverty

Count of 16yo+ blacks above poverty line in a
US Census Website
county, per year

Population

County population, per year

US Census Website

FTC Suspensions

Individuals with only an FTC

NC AOC

FTA Suspensions

Individuals with only an FTA

NC AOC

Both Suspensions

Individuals with an FTC & FTA

NC AOC

Note: All predictors (but not outcome variables) were mean-centered for analysis.
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FTC Model 1

FTC Model 2

Predictors

Estimates

CI

p

Estimates

CI

p

(Intercept)

1847.61

1450.39 –
2244.83

<0.001

1615.02

1191.60 –
2038.44

<0.001

Stops

-0.02

-0.04 – 0.00

0.088

Traffic Cases

-0.09

-0.12 – -0.07

<0.001

Whites Below

-0.17

-0.29 – -0.06

0.004

0.15

0.08 –
0.22

<0.001

Blacks Below

0.50

0.32 – 0.67

<0.001

0.04

0.01 –
0.06

0.002

Blacks Above

-0.20

-0.28 – -0.12

<0.001

0.19

0.13 –
0.24

<0.001

Whites
Above

-0.01

-0.07 – 0.04

0.605

0.09

0.05 –
0.13

<0.001

Population

0.05

0.02 – 0.09

0.001

-0.05

-0.08 –
-0.03

<0.001

Random Effects
2

263406.73

463761.25

00

2557082.79 County

3310516.65 County

44944.08 Year

103890.28 Year

0.89 County

0.85 County

0.02 Year

0.03 Year

Observations

352

800

Marginal R2 /
Conditional
R2

0.684 / 0.971

0.694 / 0.963

ICC

Note: Predictors are bolded when significant at the p < 0.05 level.
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FTA Model 1

FTA Model 2

Predictors

Estimates

CI

p

Estimates

CI

p

(Intercept)

6642.95

5063.11 –
8222.79

<0.001

6311.28

4887.35 –
7735.21

<0.001

Stops

0.01

-0.00 – 0.02

0.224

Traffic Cases

-0.07

-0.09 – -0.05

<0.001

Whites Below

0.05

-0.05 – 0.14

0.337

0.34

0.27 –
0.41

<0.001

Blacks Below

0.43

0.29 – 0.57

<0.001

0.05

0.03 –
0.07

<0.001

Blacks Above

0.39

0.31 – 0.47

<0.001

0.58

0.52 –
0.65

<0.001

Whites
Above

0.15

0.09 – 0.22

<0.001

0.21

0.16 –
0.25

<0.001

Population

-0.07

-0.11 – -0.04

<0.001

-0.13

-0.16 –
-0.10

<0.001

Random Effects
2

87948.85

311674.05

00

56954551.57 County

50060818.96 County

85445.03 Year

214523.87 Year

1.00 County

0.99 County

0.00 Year

0.00 Year

Observations

352

800

Marginal R2 /
Conditional
R2

0.637 / 0.999

0.641 / 0.998

ICC

Note: Predictors are bolded when significant at the p < 0.05 level.
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Both Model 2

Predictors

Estimates

CI

p

Estimates

CI

p

(Intercept)

1122.77

852.66 –
1392.89

<0.001

1025.4
5

738.70 –
1312.21

<0.001

Stops

-0.00

-0.01 – 0.00

0.550

Traffic Cases

-0.03

-0.04 – -0.02

<0.001

Whites Below

-0.05

-0.09 – -0.01

0.009

0.11

0.08 – 0.13

<0.001

Blacks Below

0.17

0.11 – 0.22

<0.001

0.02

0.01 – 0.03

<0.001

Blacks Above

-0.05

-0.09 – -0.02

0.001

0.08

0.06 – 0.10

<0.001

Whites
Above

0.01

-0.01 – 0.04

0.335

0.06

0.04 – 0.07

<0.001

Population

0.01

-0.00 – 0.03

0.095

-0.03

-0.04 – -0.02

<0.001

Random Effects
2

18801.21

48630.78

00

1499229.04 County

1956058.46 County

9196.14 Year

14273.95 Year

0.98 County

0.97 County

0.01 Year

0.01 Year

Observations

352

800

Marginal R2 /
Conditional
R2

0.607 / 0.995

0.654 / 0.992

ICC

Note: Predictors are bolded when significant at the p < 0.05 level.
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Appendix B: North Carolina Driver’s License Suspension Statistics by
County
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